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I am going to
speak about some lessons from the Iraq experience. One must
first state the obvious and that is that the story is not
yet completed in Iraq. It is still unfolding and nobody
knows which way it is going to go. But is has been going on
for a while and I think there is room to draw some early
lessons from that incomplete story.
So many books
have been published so far to highlight basically what went
wrong in Iraq and it is now a foregone conclusion as Prime
Minister Blair, said or implied, that it is a disaster.
If you go to
any bookshop there are so many titles. State of Denial
is the latest. I am going through it now. But amongst so
many titles that we have most of them are focused on what
went wrong in America in its planning, thinking, decision
making and implementing its plan. It is done from an
American perspective by American writers, mainly, and of
course the reason being America went into Iraq and has now
burdened itself with what could be a thousand billion
dollars by the time all this ends. The human cost is some
3,000 and a few thousand permanently disabled. There is no
question that America has lost a great deal in Iraq and this
is not the desired outcome it had in mind.
The cost to
its credibility will take decades to mend or repair. There
is the Baker Commission which is looking at how to get out
of this disaster. There will be many commissions in congress
that are going to investigate what went wrong. In the words
of many this is comparable, if not exceeding, in its impact
on America to the Vietnam war.
Having talked
a little about an American perspective, I now want to talk a
little bit about an Iraqi perspective and about an Islamic
perspective to this war. While America has lost much and the
war did not serve its interests to Iraq it was detrimental
in a negative way, so far. In Iraq the level of suffering
and death has exceeded many expectations. The latest, what
I think was a conservative figure by the Iraqi government,
was 150,000. I think the numbers are much higher. If you
want to divide the rate of death, destruction, waste of
public wealth per year to the rates of death, destruction
and waste of wealth and even deportation or displacement
compared to the Saddam years the average is tending to be
higher. That does not make Saddam look good but it does make
the situation in Iraq dire.
To Iraqis the
story is still unfolding. We are still not sure whether we
will have a united Iraq. There is no question that what we
are having in Iraq today has exceeded any worst expectation
we had earlier. I guess that makes Iraq a very expensive
lesson or experiment so to speak. So unless we draw all the
important lessons from that experiment we would have wasted
all the effort and opportunity in a very big wa.=y.
Many of you
are either academics or keen observers of politics and you
tend to ask the question what went wrong, in a particular
how come a regime that was so bad is now followed up by
conditions that are worse. What are the main factors? Is
that really a failure of the country Iraq or its people as a
nation or was is simply an indication of the failure of
Saddam and his regime and the extent of destruction that
they inflicted on Iraq? Or is it a sign of the failure of
America and its grand ideas about spreading democracy? Or is
it even a sign of a failure of maybe something bigger that
was unveiled to the region? All these are questions and I
think it is important we focus our minds on the right
questions before we try to draw any conclusions. I am not
going to answer many of these questions but I will describe
some of the things that struck me and I do want to bring
them as key lessons out of the Iraq experience.
The first one
is what I call Islamism. We cannot separate the context of
what is happening in Iraq from the context of the revival
and spread of Islamism, so to speak, throughout the
region.
Back in 1979
when the world was taken by surprise by the Islamic
Revolution in Iran the Iraq-Iran war started. It lasted
eight and a half years to the cost of maybe a million
people, huge destruction and everyone knew the war was to
keep Iran’s revolution in check because it was a force
unleashed and there was a threat to destabilize the region.
Iran as a
revolution and as a country was contained but the Islamic
movement that came out of it that inspired many other
movements throughout the globe continued. A much distorted
version of it started to emerge in other countries. The
worst version of it was what happened in Afghanistan by the
Taliban. But even what happened in Afghanistan by the
Taliban and then Al Qaeda and Bin Laden could not take the
steam of the drive towards the “Islamic aspirations” of
millions of Muslims who are living in dysfunctional states
where conditions are dire, who are looking for something to
hold on to. And here come different modalities and leaders
who say we have the answers for you.
Nothing would
stop that drive effectively other than a strife within. And
it is with regret that what we see in Iraq today is a
parliament with elected leaders predominately Islamic -
Shias and Sunnis - which is more or less in charge and
responsible for the dire situation in the country.
Islam is
supposed to give a message that it is supposed to inspire
unity and strengthen bonds between Muslims. In Iraq it has
effectively become a a reason to divide the nation, tribes
and even families. What was supposed to be a call for
development, growth and protection of life has become a
license to kill in the name of religion. A very bad example
and a very bad experience.
Lessons have
not been drawn yet but the younger generation is going to be
on a cross roads: either they totally abandon Islam based
on that experience and maybe go for a total separation of
religion and politics. That is a possibility. Or I assume
the second more likely possibility is going to be a more
radical revision of not Islam itself. I think the Muslims
can easily recognize that this is not a failure in Islam,
but it is certainly a failure of those movements that are
adopting Islam. And it is not a failure out of lack of
experience in politics or government, it is not a failure
out of human weakness in handling power. It is a failure in
developing programmes that can run very tough situations.
One very
important lesson that will emerge, it hasn’t materialized
yet, is that there will be a more radical revision of Islam
and its role in politics. In what way it is yet to emerge
but the Iraq experience is not going to be limited to Iraq.
The Shia-Sunni issue is not going to be limited to Iraq. It
has the capacity and the potential to go further in the
region. If it is not contained now it can be very much a
cause of destruction of the Islamic discourse itself that
was initially unleashed in 1979 with the Islamic revolution.
Or it is going to become a key turning point in its
reformation.
And one last
point here. If you would have asked Iraqi Arabs Shias and
Sunni three or four years ago do you want to divide your
country along Shia-Sunni lines you would hardly find one
person who would argue that position. You would find the
majority of Kurds would argue why they want a separate
Kurdistan in various forms and ways. But you would hardly
find one person who would advocate an agenda that would call
for dividing the country along Shia-Sunni lines.
When Saddam
fell in April 2003 there were no sectarian killings or
backlash. No such killings were taking place. In fact for a
year or two there were no sectarian killings in Iraq. All
opinion polls that were taken in Iraq, many of them very
serious and credible, indicated generally (over 90 percent)
were looking for a unity government and a revived role for
the state without Saddam. They liked Iraq, they liked the
state of Iraq, they liked everything about it, they just
didn’t like Saddam and his regime.
What happened
in the last three years that transformed not only public
opinion but reality in every district, every street, every
corner in Iraq to this ugly reality? Iraqis prided
themselves in the past that there have never been sectarian
killings in their 1,000 year history. The shrine of Samarra
was in a predominantly Sunni area but that was not an issue.
The Iraqi tribes switch from partially becoming Shias to
partially becoming Sunnis naturally. There is a very high
level of intermarriage and it is not an issue. To them it
was just not possible to anticipate or to extract that there
were going to be sectarian killings.
But it is a
reality today. My argument is that it did not happen by
accident. It does not simply indicate it was all caused by
an ill will from outsiders but there is an element of ill
will. It indicates most importantly that there has been a
weakness in Iraq amongst Iraqi politicians and amongst Iraqi
religious institutions to have withheld or withstood that
new virus that was released on them. That killer virus that
is not only eating away the fabric of Iraqi society but more
likely if it is unchecked or unaddressed will spread to
other countries in the region. That is a key theme we need
to look at.
A second key
issue is how grossly many have over-estimated Americas
intelligence and have under-estimated how dangerous
Americas exposure to influence might be. America is a super
power and with it comes a lot of responsibilities and
assumptions. I was in Washington DC on 9/11, I have seen the
impact 9/11 had on America’s think tank policy makers and I
have seen how a paralysis struck not only the American
administration but all the establishment in Washington.
A very small
pressure group lobby managed to push an agenda that could
have never been left unchecked under normal conditions. But
it was that state of paralysis and I think up until now if
there is one major lesson to be learned out of this it is
that it is so important to have a voice and presence in
America itself. America is so much open to lobbying and to
influence that simply to keep a distance and to assume that
America will take responsibility without effective input and
effective influence and interaction is basically
surrendering your own interests and your own fate in the
hand of the rival or of the other.
I have seen
and heard many who argue with conspiracy theories about
America’s deliberate design to destroy Iraq and to have the
conditions that are currently in Iraq. I think that one can
talk emotionally to endorse such assumptions but they do not
bear much truth. If you want to look at it objectively,
America has lost a great deal in the Iraq venture and
America is drawing its own lessons out of what happened in
Iraq.
If we were to
adopt a more objective language rather than a subjective or
moral language and look at who are the winners and losers
out of the Iraq episode I think that on the side of losers
definitely Iraq is a loser: although Iraqis have their
freedom they have lost a lot in the process. America has
lost a great deal of credibility. This will emerge on the
losers side. The Islamic movements throughout the region
have lost a great deal. Whether they are aware of it is a
different issue but what I call the noble cause of
advocating an Islamic message has suffered a great deal
because of the mess we have in Iraq.
Again putting
aside conspiracy theories and looking purely objectively on
who are the beneficiaries of the mess in Iraq, on the one
hand comes Israel. It has weakened one major Arab state that
has been problematic for a while. It is questionable whether
Iraq today is an Arab state because there has been a big
resistance to adding that line in its constitution. The
Kurds are major beneficiaries from the situation in Iraq
because basically today Iraq is two: there is Kurdistan that
is flourishing, attracting foreign investment, high rise
buildings, consolidated institutions, imported labour from
the Far East – all indicators of development. And you have
the rest of Iraq which is basically on fire. If the rest of
Iraq were to regain its strength as one big region than this
would weaken the Kurdish region. Kurdish leaders know that.
The third
beneficiary is Iran. America has demolished the Baath
regime and put Saddam on trial. Looking purely from an
objective point of view Iraq represented a counter weight to
Iran. When Saddam played the Arab card on Iran he did not
play it out of a void. He played it because there was a role
for Iraq to play and that role has been totally undermined
and gone. Iran’s regional position has become much stronger
because of the situation in Iraq. Again I state these as
objective facts not implicating or passing judgments on any
of these players.
There is
another main theme which I think is important to bring to
light. Until April 2003, myself, my colleagues all or us in
the opposition have argued rightly that Saddam was
responsible for all the ills in Iraq. He was the sole
decision maker, he had full constitutional powers, effective
power, he took all these big decisions, he was responsible
for the death and destruction that happened in Iraq.
After April
2003 the responsibility started to shift and a great deal of
it went on America. America undertook the responsibility of
the invasion and with it assumed responsibility for post war
planning. And whatever Bremmer or Rumsfeld did the bottom
line is they took responsibility for what happened in
Iraq.
After two
national elections in Iraq where the Iraqi people have
elected their deputies after a process where institutions,
especially religious institutions played a role, Iraqis now
take responsibility for the mess in their country. One can
argue quite rightly it is an unfair way of taking
responsibility because they were not given a clean slate
to work with. They were handed conditions that were
difficult to start with, their hands were tied, state
institutions were dismantled, borders were left open all
sorts of measures took place and they were simply handed
that mess: you take it now. That is not fair it is true but
the bottom line is it is their responsibility and today they
either mend their country, ask for the troops to leave. Or
they can continue the conditions as they are and simply
prove they are not up to taking responsibility for that
country and there will be a great deal of suffering.
As I state
facts it might sound pessimistic. I must add a few notes on
the positive side. Iraq is a country or a land that has a
lot of promise. A few years ago when I was asked how do you
see Iraq after Saddam Hussein I really saw Iraq as the
turning point for the whole region not simply because it is
going to offer democracy or be the first country in the
Middle East that would hold free elections as such but
because Iraq has the diversity of Shias and Sunnis. To
Shias it is the land of Shiism: the six imams are buried in
Iraq. For a thousand years the Shia seminary, the Hausa is
in Iraq itself. All the faces of the evolution of the Shias
are in Iraq.
Baghdad was
the capital of the Abbasid era for a long time. More
importantly Abu Hanifa is in Baghdad only across the river
from the shrines of Imam Khadim and Jawad. Across the
street is the shrine of Gailani, a Sufi, whose followers go
deep into central Asia.
So with all
this promise if the Iraqis can put a system, a regime that
is successful it has the potential to become the centre of
gravity for the region. It has a lot of promise. What
happened in Iraq should not be underestimated: we have lost
a generation or two. The impact on women and children will
take a generation of two to recover. But knowing what I know
about Iraq and its people I remain strong in my faith and I
remain optimistic.
Iraqis are
extremely resilient. Nothing inspired me more when I was in
Baghdad then to see some of the staff who worked in the
office. They would come late sometimes by an hour or half
and hour and they would apologise because on their way to
work there was a car bomb or there was a clash and they had
to take shelter for half an hour. That spirit that
basically defies pessimism and death is very deep among
Iraqis. It is sad what happened, it is tough and it can
break anybody’s soul or morale but having felt and seen the
experience in Iraq I remain optimistic.
There is one
last remark I will make purely from a Shia point of view. I
think when speaking on a forum like this I am not sure what
type of audience I will get and what angle I need to
emphasise. I have a variety of points. For those who know
Shi’ism as a school that emerged in mainstream Islam
throughout history the Shias who followed the imams took a
line of not compromising their principles. If it came to an
issue of taking a moral stand, a principled stand or going
for power or material gains they always opted for taking the
principled stand. This has been very much a painful
experience throughout history and there have been many
voices among the Shias who questioned why do you take that
line.
What’s
happening in Iraq today is changing, at least partially, the
face of Shiism. Shiism has never been equated to
sectarianism. Let me just give you to solid examples. The
famous words of Imam Ali when he was asked about the
argument that took place immediately after the death of the
Prophet. They said ‘We have to refer to Quraish’. His famous
words were: ‘They held to the tree but they let go of the
fruit’. It is a saying that sometimes may be warning Shias
not simply to hold on to power and let go of the main issue
which is the principles behind these powers.
And the
second story is told every year during the month of Ramadan
about the death of Imam Ali, the martyrdom. He was hit by
his killer. He survived for three days before his death. He
asked his guards not to kill or harm the man who tried to
kill him but to keep him in custody and to treat him like
they treat all other prisoners of war. And if the Imam died
they simply have to implement the Islamic code a life for a
life and he has to be executed. And if he is executed
nothing is to be done with his body except to be given a
burial as a Muslim. If the Imam stayed alive of course he
would not have killed the man who attempted to kill him.
These were the instructions of Imam Ali.
Today what we
are seeing in Iraq, especially after what was unleashed
after the attack on the two shrines in Samarra, is a wave
of sectarian killings in which the Shias participated.
Somebody might criticize me and say why aren’t you
highlighting what Al Qaeda is doing, why aren’t you
highlighting what Saddam was doing? That goes without
saying. We have been highlighting this. Why don’t you
highlight what the Americans are doing? Again that goes
without saying. I am highlighting what the Shias are doing
who for 1,400 years held to principles and basically
honoured their Imams who absorbed a lot of pain and did not
compromise their principles.
At this
moment when they came to power I can see a lot of weakness
or rushing to power at a cost of principles. I think those
lessons will also hit and cut deep within Shiism in Iraq.
That was a notion that was often referred to in the 70s by
an Iranian writer, Ali Shiariti. He always talked about two
types of Shiism, a Safawi Shiism and an Allawi Shiism. The
world has changed a lot in the past 30 years and those words
are regrettably equated with two different meanings.
But I think
the events of Iraq are not only going to force reviews
within the Islamic movement but they are going to have a
lasting impact also on the new, emerging face of Shiism in
Iraq.
I think what
I wanted to do in the time given was to touch on enough
topics hopefully to provoke some feedback and interesting
discussions so I will stop there.
* Dr Laith Kubba
is the author of Common Ground on Iraq-Kuwait
Reconciliation. Born and educated in Baghdad, he graduated
from Baghdad University and received his Ph.D. from the
University of Wales. Over the past two decades, he has
served on the executive committees of a number of Arab and
Muslim organizations including the Arab Organization for
Human Rights in London. He was also a member of the Joint
Action Committee of the Iraqi opposition and a founding
member of both the Iraqi National Congress and The Iraq
Foundation. Since 1991, Kubba has been contributing to
international conferences on both Iraqi and Islamic issues.
He had been the Director of International Relations at the
al-Khoei Foundation in London, and currently works with the
National Endowment for Democracy in Washington | 
