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Introduction:
Saeed Shehabi As we all know
the Palestinian issue, the Arab Israeli conflict, has been
the core or problems in the Middle East over the past 50 or
sixty years. It is unlikely to disappear soon and it is also
unlikely to keep the region stable. Today as we listen to
statements by president and prime ministers all over the
world there is a unanimous view that unless the Palestinian
issue is solved the region will remain unstable. There will
always be instability, confusion and political as well as
military movements. We want to discuss the recent war
between Israel and Hizbollah which apart from the view of
President Bush was not sorted out in favour of Israel.
Hezbollah has been given of a least a psychological victory
if not an outright military victory. We will discuss this
issue tonight with two distinguished speakers.
Nizar Abboud:
It is very hard to talk about the conflict because you know
so many details and you do not know what to say and what not
to say. I was born in 1948 and it is no secret now, you can
tell by my grey hair. I have lived in that part of the
region, especially after the creation of Israel on the land
of Palestine and I have known it all right from the
beginning. I will speak as an eye witness from that area and
why we are keen to maintain the resistance.
My early
recollections about South Lebanon is that we were
marginalised by every Lebanese society: we were just there
near the border. We were denied any real help from the
governments. Even someone who wanted to visit us from Sideon
or Beirut needed permission to move from any city into the
south Lebanon border area because this was a no access area
for anyone who wanted to view that virgin part of Lebanon
because it remained virgin for such a long time.
The reason for that
which we did not know was that the rivers were running
freely into the sea. There were probably other plans or
designs which could be used an ulterior purpose for a buffer
zone between two states: the new state and our state.
We were scared all
the time just looking at Israel. It was a nightmare to drive
your car, or your donkey at that time, near the border
because it was a scary place. It was meant to scare you. We
had to survive by trying not to be close to that area.
Then we had so many
wars in Lebanon: in 1958 the Lebanese system which is built
on schizophrenic foundations. There was a dispute about
whether we are Arabs. Are we Arabs or are we just
Mediterranean, European or just Muslims. The crisis of
identity in Lebanon has always been there ever since its
inception even before 1943 when the French colonial power
left that area.
For many decades in
the 19th century we had civil wars all about identity.
Lebanon was a mosaic and south Lebanon in particular was a
no-go area for many people. Only those who were banished
could stay in that part of the world : schools and services
were at a minimum level. Then we had wars: the 1956
tri-partied aggression against Egypt and the Suez crisis.
In 1958 there was the Baghdad Pact and Lebanon had to side
with that pact, Chamoun at the zenith of the Maronite power
decided to side with the Americans. Then there is the Muslim
or pan Arab view which wanted us to be more Arab and more
associated with our neighbourhood. And then we had one of
two choices: to be with Syria or to be with Israel. So
Lebanese society has always been split because we have many
cultures that are closer to Europe and the Mediterranean
than to the Arabs.
So this crisis
reflected itself in 1958 in a mini civil war during Nasser's
time. After that we had to again accommodate ourselves with
each other. And suddenly we had the Six Day War and Lebanon
stayed outside that conflict for many reasons one of them
not annoy those who considered themselves not Arabs or more
affiliated with the West then with the Arabs. This created
a real crisis inside Lebanon. The Lebanese asked :"Why
didn't we support the Arabs? Why didn't we fight? Why were
we not involved in that war. Long after that the Palestinian
refugees who were in Lebanon started resisting along with
Lebanese who started to help the Palestinians on national
grounds. Then in the late 60s we had the feydeen phenomenon
in South Lebanon.
South Lebanon became
a ground for the first conflict . On a regular basis
infiltrators used to go inside and try to liberate their
land. And the people of south Lebanon had to take the
retaliation from the Israelis.
I remember very
well when we opened the first office for Fateh in Al Kyahem.
That was in 1968 or 1969. Then the people of the small town
of ten thousand really demonstrated and they forced the army
to accept the first office for the Palestinian feydeen to be
opened in south Lebanon. From Al Kyahem it spread little by
little with the support of the population. Every town had an
office for the Palestinian resistance and many Lebanese were
involved. The people of the south wanted to tell the
Palestinians that they were not alone and to stress that we
sympathize with you and we do not accept this dual
identity.
That war lasted between 1968 and 1975.
We had real war starting in 1968 in south Lebanon and the
feelings were very high that Israel is the enemy, people
were killed the cities in south Lebanon were randomly in the
attacks on south Lebanese towns and cities. There was an
attack on Beirut International Airport in 1969. Many
Palestinian leaders were killed by the Israeli mossad who
were there. This really establishes Lebanon was involved.
Because they did not fight in 1967 Lebanon and Jordan were
involved in guerrilla warfare for the first time. Then
things started.
The war spilled over into Beirut itself.
In that civil war between 1975 and 1991 we had many other
wars where Israeli invasions took place like in May 1978.
The Israelis decided they would establish their buffer zone
and they really moved in heavily in many towns and the area
was depleted of the population.
Out of this turmoil and out of the
invasions and especially after 1982 there was no real role
for the central government in Beirut. This is what made the
people believe that it is time they really filled this
vacuum of power. The central government doesn’t care about
that part of Lebanon, then the people themselves should care
about it.
The Palestinians abused their power
when they were in the south and did not care about the
services. They just used the land to launch attacks and did
not care about the retaliation. They were not involved in
defending the towns themselves. They just used hit and run
tactics. They would for example attack Al Mutala in northern
Palestine and we expected that all our towns would be
shelled and people would be killed in exchange for someone
who just mischievously fired katusha rockets.
This culminated in the 1982 invasion when
Israel went in. There was no real resistance in south
Lebanon. Within a few days Beirut was invaded. They did not
plan to go into Beirut. The original plan was to reach the
Aouni River near Sideon but since there was no resistance
and total withdrawal the Israelis carried on and they
managed to get the PLO out of Lebanon.
The people of the south found themselves
without the Palestinians and without real support from the
Lebanese government. In Beirut some Lebanese took their
weapons and started shooting at the Israelis. I remember
very well the Al Hamra incident when some Israeli officers
felt too safe staying in a café and someone wearing a tie
and a suit came out of a taxi and shot at them. Hours later
there was another attack on the Israelis and seven Israeli
soldiers went into a building and seven of them did not come
down. The next day we heard the Israelis with their loud
speakers shouting: “We don’t want to fight anymore in the
city, we are withdrawing from the city, please don’t shoot
at us”.
That was the first defeat of the Israeli
army. I think the Israelis reached their peak at that time.
We have seen defeat after defeat of the Israelis. They were
evicted from Beirut. It did not happen by a central
government decision, it did not happen by a decision from
Syria, Iran, Cuba or Vietnam. It simply happened by an
individual initiative. Some parties took the initiative.
They felt they are too humiliated to be invaded like that.
They felt it was total humiliation when they saw the
Israelis with the pflange their supporters who identified
with them and with the West.. It was time to fight for their
dignity and the dignity of their families. And I believe
this was the origin of Hezbollah.
It emerged from that strife, from that
conflict when some people thought it is time, we have to
fight. Since 1982 the resistance fighting went on despite
the internal conflicts between different groups and parties:
secular and non-secular, even between Hezbollah and Amal at
a certain stage for the control of certain areas. That
reflects that Lebanon is made up of multi-cultures and multi
allegiances.
After the latest victory some people
denied a victory because in south Lebanon a few thousand
fighters managed to repel the Israelis and stay for almost
34 days resisting the strongest army in the Middle East
supported by the United States and Britain with state of
the art technology, the best weapons, the best intelligence
and satellite photos. These elite fighters managed to repel
the elite Israeli army.
This shows how much faith they have in
what they are doing and how much they don’t trust anyone to
come to their rescue. This means they were prepared to fight
because they knew from that long experience that no one
would come to their rescue.
They learned from 1948 when the
Palestinians went out from Palestine in the hope that they
would return supported by the Arab armies, that there are
no Arab armies to come to their rescue. And they knew that
neither Syria. Iran, Egypt or any other state would
jeopardize their security and come and fight alongside them.
So they were prepared for an all out fight to the end and
they were prepared to die or to win or to martyr. This was
the name of the game because these people know winning is a
must and they are prepared to die for winning. It is not
just death for death: it is death for the sake of their
integrity and for the defense of Lebanon.
Those people who are on the other side
of the camp believe that there was no victory: they do not
want to believe that Lebanon could become a fighting force
in the Middle East. They want Lebanon to be business place a
tourist place more than a real country. They view Lebanon
like Ali Baba’s cave where you can put your money take it
out, bring it in any time and it is safe there. It is a
business city, it is not a real city. They never believed
that Lebanon is a real society.
Herein lies the dilemma. These people
talk about Lebanon, Lebanese independence first and Lebanon
last. There is nobody but Lebanon. The others talk about it
from a business point of view as long as this Lebanon can
bring them results. Before the Taif agreement we had a
different set of coalitions which means the factional
society of Lebanon. After that we had the oligarchs in
Lebanon emerging as a new power and negating the present
chieftains and the feudal lords, even the war lords. These
came with a huge wealth backed by Middle Eastern oil wealth.
A new alliance was emerging in Lebanon
after the Taif Agreement where Mr Hairiri came as a tycoon
and he used his wealth to have more alliances inside
Lebanon, not just on an ethnic or sectarian basis. He had
alliances and affiliates from all factions from the
Christians and Maronites – even the Syrians were working
with Hairiri because of his financial power. His power was
not just in Lebanon, it even extended to Europe.
For a certain time this was used very
well until his assassination. He managed to compromise the
fighting, resisting Lebanon with the old system which could
talk to the west and to the east at the same time. He was
pragmatic and he knew that the resistance could yield good
results for the dream country he wanted to create.
Then this détente between the resistance
and the state managed to work well until the liberation in
2000 and after that and we see Mr Hairiri actively in 1996
for the April understanding to protect the towns and
villages: if we do not attack your civilian, you will not
attack our civilians. Let the fight be between armies.
Those who assassinated Hairiri wanted to
bring that understanding to a close. They wanted Lebanon to
be purely on this side especially with the new Middle East
envisaged by the USA and their plans for the area to make
pax Americana in the Middle East where Israel is dominating
power and the states will be split into many ethnic states
as we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and others. We suddenly
found ourselves facing many assassinations in previous
months. We do not know exactly who was killing who but at
the same time there were assassinations of leaders of the
resistance.
What is going to happen now is on
everybody’s mind and after the victory. There is a real
conflict now inside Lebanon between two factions: the 14
March group and the 8th of March group.
The 14th March are the
Hairiri camp or the future camp, the flange and the
Lebanese forces with the Druze aligned together versus
Hezbollah and the other national groups and political
parties.
The victory is not accepted by the 14th
March camp because they believe this will make Lebanon a
confrontational country in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 8th
March camp believe they are part of the Middle East and they
should really defend the country. Lebanon is strong by its
strength not by its weakness as per the old saying.
How can this be resolved? I think on
Friday (September 22nd) we will see a big
celebration victory. This will reflect and show how many
Lebanese support the 8th March camp. The victory
has given that party a much stronger power than it used to
have.
The state of Lebanon is such that so
much corruption has taken place during the past 15 – 16
years that the government itself is unable to deliver even
basic things to the people. Before this war Hezbollah
achieved some understanding with Michel Aoun across the
barriers of factional alliances. For the first time the
Christians, the Shias the Druze - many of these are in one
camp working together on a national basis and that is going
to reflect on Lebanon. This time we are talking about
political fault lines, not factional or sectarian fault
lines as was the case before all these wars.
Wars have transformed Lebanon and people
now think more about politics than they used to think in the
past. The old leaders tried to bring things back to where
they used to be because in this way they can have more
popularity among their constituencies. The victory has
changed this rule and it will remain like this for a long
time because the victory has its supporters in every sect
and in every category of society. Even those who think that
the Sunnis are purely with Hairiri and 14th
March group are mistaken. There is a long history where
these groups have fought alongside the Palestinians and
alongside the resistance and we have seen in recent wars
some Sunnis martyred in the fight, at least three of them.
That is a real change. It is not purely Shia anymore.
Everybody hopes that Lebanon will emerge out of that in a
better constitutional shape as a country not as just a
mosaic of factions.
Saeed Shehabi:
Thank you for this analysis of the development of the
political situation in Lebanon with regard to the conflict
with Israel from the 1950s until the last war. Of course it
is clear that he is hoping that the forthcoming times will
be better in terms of national reconciliation although he is
also casting doubts on the intentions of some groups who are
not ready to acknowledge the victory. We share his optimism,
we hope that the doubt that he has will not be realized in
the future because Lebanese unity is necessary in order to
enable that country to face up to the challenges of the
Israelis.
George Joffe:
I would like to talk about are the consequences of what has
occurred in the last two months and try to understand what
the implications of all this are going to be for the Middle
East, but not just for the Middle East but in a more global
sense.
I would like to begin with a statement
from somebody who is not one of my favorite politicians, but
who on this occasion actually said what is correct and that
is Condelezza Rice. She said towards the end of the
conflict, towards the end of those 34 days of bombardment
of Lebanon that we are seeing the birth of a new Middle
East. I think that is correct.
But I am also convinced that the Middle
East that is to come is not the Middle East that she
anticipates. It is not going to be a Middle East based on
democracy rather than stability in terms of Western
interests. It may well be democracy but it will not arise
for those reasons. It is not going to be a Middle East that
is pro the USA nor indeed prepared to accept in its current
form the situation of Israel.
I know that many governments have come to
terms with the fact that Israel is now part of the
architecture of the region. But the way Israel has behaved
over the last two months is such that I find it difficult to
imagine that any state in the region could accept Israel as
it currently exists. And I think that is one part of what we
need to analyse.
I should add that it seems to me that
the situation in the Middle East today is worse than I can
ever remember and I have quite a long memory going back some
40 years. I really think it is disastrous. Having said that
we need to think about what this means because as in all
situations of this kind there are winners and there are
losers and I think we need to understand who and what they
are and what their gains and losses are.
To understand that we need to bear in
mind something else. The gains and losses are not merely
objective facts. It is not just what actually happened on
the ground that counts here. It is also a question of what
the perceptions of gains and losses are. You are perceived
to have won and you are perceived to have lost. And beyond
that to it is also a question of those who won by not
loosing and those who lost by not winning.
So it is an extremely complex set of
different values and outcomes. And then finally we need to
consider the direct and indirect consequences of what has
occurred. There are those who are engaged inside the Middle
East in the problems of the region. There are those who are
affected by it though not necessarily engaged by it.
So basically that is what I want to try
and do. To establish in all those terms, objective losses,
objective gains, perceptions of losses and gains and gains
that were not losses and losses that were not gains. I want
to analyse how it actually affects the region.
I have to begin, of course with the core
adversaries. Ostensibly the core adversaries were Israel and
Lebanon, the states engaged in the struggle. But I wonder
whether the struggle wasn’t another kind of struggle
involving Hezbollah and indirectly Hamas. What you are
actually looking at is the consequence of asymmetric warfare
inside the region. For the first time it is not so much
states that count but movement within states with particular
objectives and the way in which the outcome has affected
them may prove to be more important in the future. Non state
actors now play a role equivalent to states inside the
region.
Let me begin with states because in
some ways I think they are still very significant. Both
Lebanon and Israel lost heavily. Lebanon quite clearly
because of the material damage and loss of life. But Israel
much more because it did not succeed in a project which was
ill-founded, ill-directed, unacceptable morally,
unacceptable politically and certainly unacceptable
diplomatically.
The problem for Israel is that it did
not achieve its primary objective which was first to destroy
Hezbollah and second to subjugate the Lebanese state into
part of the diplomatic hinterland with which it could live.
Its perceived to have failed as well, even though it did
massive damage to Lebanon and also in a sense to Hezbollah
as well.
The perception of its failure has one
very important significance and here I would like to remind
you of something which you won’t have thought of I am sure:
the collapse of colonial empires inside the Middle East
dates from 1930. It was the year in which the cracks inside
the imperial edifice started to appear. It was reinforced in
1940 with the Second World War. It wasn’t that either
Britain or France were really weakened, but they were
perceived to be weakened and that meant that resistance to
them became a viable alternative.
What has happened with the case of the
war in Lebanon is that the idea has been perceived to be
weak, has been perceived not to be able to carry through its
agenda with all the massive means at its disposal and
particularly it could not defend Israel. It could not
prevent the rocket attacks down as far as Haifa and even
further south. That is the first thing. It has lost
credibility because it could not defend.
But it has also lost credibility in the
wider world because it behaved in ways that are construed to
be criminal. It has been accused of war crimes and I think
that is probably justified. And worse than that in pursuing
its primary objective of trying defeat Hezbollah it also
behaved indiscriminately and used the tactic of terror in
effect to try and achieve its objectives.
So in a sense thereby it has lost an
awful lot And that is going to have its implications in
terms of the way in which Israel behaved before, not
necessarily good. But certainly it will affect it. Yet
having said that we need to bear in mind that in one sense
some of its objectives were achieved. The United Nations
Security Council Resolution when it finally came, when it
was allowed to come did set up a boundary force. It did
replace the failed security zone in the south. There are now
15,000 troops from Europe and Turkey there. How viable that
is going to be we don’t know but it marks a change in the
situation. It did require in effect that Hezbollah should
withdraw in a sense that at least it would not be able to
launch attacks within that zone and at the moment that
holds.
So there is some kind of security
restored to Israel. And Israel is allowed under the
resolution to respond if attacks do occur. So you could
argue that one objective: that of guaranteeing the security
of northern Israel was partly achieved, at least
temporarily. That is a very meager gain but nonetheless it
is a gain.
There are some indirect effects too but I
think we can best see those if we look at the situation
inside Lebanon itself. Lebanon did lose objectively,
massively, even if there was a solidarity cemented within
the Lebanese population. It lost because of the loss of
life, it lost because of the damage to the infrastructure,
it lost because of the damage to private property. There
were an estimated $15bn worth of losses and that is pretty
heavy.
But the war also increased inter
communal tensions. I accept that there may well have been a
solidification of resistance. Indeed I know that. But we
can’t deny that the split between the Maronite community in
particular and the Shia community in particular is now more
intense than it was. It is interesting to note, and this
pre-dated the war, that there was a split in the Maronite
community between the Aoun faction and the Lebanese forces.
And that is very significant.
It is interesting to note too that Amal
and Hezbollah are perhaps for the first time operating
together – or so it appears. That is certainly significant.
But it does mean that the division between the two factions
of the kind that my colleague outlined is now a reality.
That is a great danger because the Lebanese state must now
be extremely fragile. It would not take very much for that
breakage to become more permanent. In other words, there is
a danger of a kind anticipated last year after the
assassination of Rafiq Hairiri which now seems more real. A
break-up of the Lebanese state is a possibility
I know the Lebanese will fight against
that and will try to prevent it from occurring. But we can’t
deny that now, as a result of the pressure of the war, it
is a greater danger than it was in the past.
I also wonder where the Sunnis and the
Druze are going to place themselves. But again even though
there are some very negative outcomes there are some
positive outcomes too to the Lebanese government. It has
been able, for example, to restore its authority, or some
kind of nominal authority. The Lebanese army is there. It
has not been there for 15 years or more. It may be a nominal
presence and even though it will do little to contribute
towards the objectives laid down in the United Nations
Security Council resolution it is there.
As a result of the war and the way in
which it began and the consequences of the violence it is
true to say that the Lebanese government can once again, and
now in slightly different circumstances, open up the
crucial question of the relationship of the government to
Hezbollah. That could be significant. I have no idea of the
way it will play out but it will be significant.
There are some domestic consequences for
Israel and we have to bear these in mind because these will
have a very direct effect on what will happen in the next
few days. There is to be a meeting of the quartet at the
end of the week (Friday 22nd September). What
they can actually do will in part be determined by what has
occurred.
Inside Israel the Olmert government is
dead. It continues to operate but it is only a matter of
time before it disappears. This raises a very unpleasant
possibility that the next government will be much more
extreme. Almost certainly it will be led by Mr Netanyahu. He
is no friend of anybody and certainly not of Lebanon.
Therefore we have to anticipate that there is a grave danger
that he may try to correct the mistakes that Mr Olmert made.
It will require very little to provoke Israel into a further
attack of the kind we have just seen. That we been directly
related to the nature of the success of the consequent
Israeli government.
The second consequence is that any idea
of unilateral withdrawal will not happen. I can’t imagine
that the Israeli public will accept any arrangement that
reduces Israel’s presence inside the occupied territories.
Even if the government could be persuaded to talk to the new
Hamas –Fatah unity government, don’t assume that it would do
so seriously or genuinely. I think it most unlikely.
So actually despite the murmurs in
Europe and the murmurs in Washington of hope of a solution
and new opportunity opened up by the war I don’t think that
is the case at all. We need to look again at what happened
to Hezbollah. There is no doubt that Hezbollah has acquired
a status and prestige which is without parallel. I can think
of no other group, non-state actor inside the Middle East
that has achieved so much in terms of its prestige, so
quickly. And that is even though Sheikh Nasrallah has
admitted that the seizure of the soldier was a
miscalculation. He never anticipated a response of the kind
that actually occurred.
The simple fact of surviving and fighting
in itself is a demonstration of the power of the mind
inside the Middle East. Lessons were to all other factors
that will actually reinforce the role of Hezbollah as a
resistance movement and as an example inside the region.
That has come at a cost. One I have
already indicated. The crisis within the Maronite community,
the crisis within the Lebanese government and the future
relationship between the two. It has come at the cost too
that even though there is a renewal of unity inside the
south, there is now foreign force and that may be both a
provocation and a hindrance to Hezbollah being able to
further its agenda to force out Israel from the south.
And there is an important speculation
that we need to undertake. Why did they actually decide to
capture the soldiers in the first place. I will give you
three possible reasons that have been suggested. I am not
certain that any of them are true forceful reasons but
nonetheless they give an indication of the complexity of the
situation that we now face.
The first is that it is actually part
of a complex process of trying to prevent some kind of
concessions to Israel after its misbehavior in the last five
years. It begins with the organization by Marshad in
Damascus of the initial Hamas seizure of a soldier outside
the Gaza Strip. And in that context the argument is that
Hezbollah wanted to give support to Hamas by repeating that
experience.
The second explanation is that it
fulfilled a long-standing Hezbollah promise, one that was
echoed throughout Lebanon, of forcing Israel to disgorge the
prisoners that it has held in some cases for decades as it
had successfully done in 2004.
The third explanation is that this was
done simply because Hezbollah is the creature of Iran and
Syria. Certainly Iran and Syria supported it. Certainly they
are crucial to its ability to operate effectively both as an
element inside the political structure of Lebanon and as a
resistance organization. But I know of no evidence that
suggests that Israel simply resonates to Iranian and Syrian
demands.
But the consequences of its actions has
been to change the position of both states.
Those changes inside the European Union
are a direct consequence of the re-evaluation of the
situation inside the Middle East forced on the European
statesmen by the events in Lebanon and the war. And in that
context Hezbollah’s actions have a profound effect on the
geo-politics of the region.
But that raises a very disturbing
consideration about the United States. Where does it stand
and what is it going to do? At the moment the United States
is profoundly discomforted inside the region. It has the
crisis in Iraq, the crisis in Afghanistan, Israel’s failure
in the recent war and the situation with Iran regarding arms
control to deal with. So the question is how is the United
States now going to respond in the face of what are a series
of diplomatic defeats.
The assumption is that the United States
will continue to be concerned about multi-literalism, that
it will co-operate with Europe, that it will in effect try a
more mature approach. I have to tell you I think that
calculation is profoundly misguided. To assume that the
neo-conservative tendency inside the United States that has
driven the formulation of foreign policy since 2001 as
somehow being overturned in Washington is to profoundly
misunderstand the nature of the political process there.
The neo-conservative ascendancy still
applies despite its reverses in Iraq or indeed with Israel.
This means that the Bush administration after a period will
not necessarily respond to more multi-literalism. It will
not necessarily tolerate European hesitancy and indeed the
evidence is beginning to emerge that that is the case We
know that the United States supported Israel in its war and
supported it because it saw the war as a mechanism for
destroying Hezbollah and thereby changing the political
dispensations inside the region.
We know too that the United States has
plans in being to attack Iran. Ninety-four sites have been
identified as key to the disruption of the Iranian programme
in nuclear power, whatever that may mean for nuclear
weapons. We know too that airforce planners anticipate that
there will be collateral damage, that between 2,000 and
15,000 people will be killed, simply because of the location
of the sites that they want to destroy. We learned yesterday
that the United States Navy has been told to prepare
eventuality plans for the possibility of such engagements.
We also know that in the more lunatic
fringes of the neo-conservative groups that influence policy
in Washington there is an alternative plan in being as well.
It is to isolate Kozastan from the rest of Iran thereby
starving the regime of oil and oil revenues. Use the Ahwazi
Arabs as the mechanism by which this can be done and thereby
hope to see the regime overthrown by a popular uprising. I
seem to have heard that somewhere before – there was a
similar sort of plan for Iraq. It may seem irrational to
you but that does not mean it cannot actually occur.
The problem is we don’t know what the
outcome is going to be and we don’t know actually what the
European response to such plans will be either. Do not
assume that Europe will somehow reject these ideas. Europe
is profoundly imbued with the same assumptions as now
inform the neo-conservatives in Washington. And beyond that
too European statesmen depend heavily on the idea of the
trans-Atlantic Alliance. They are not going to abandon that.
So there are still certain uncertainties in Europe as well.
The there are other factors. There is the
question of China and India: these are factors which cannot
be ignored: not because they are major military powers but
because they operate economic and political alternatives
inside the Middle East itself. In effect we are seeing a
recreation of the situation of the Cold War inside the
Middle East. Once again Middle Eastern power are
beginning to look towards alternative sources of influence
and power to balance off the pressures they find themselves
under from Washington or from Europe.
And the finally there is the question of
what is actually happening inside the Arab world. I can’t
imagine a worst outcome for established regimes. They are
even further discredited then they were. Anti-Westernism is
even more intense. It is not just directly against the
United States. A kind of credibility is being given to the
thesis of Samuel Huntington that there is in fact a clash,
and it is a cultural clash and it is innate. And at the
popular level the thesis of Salafi jihadism has been given
an enormous boost. That must in effect argue for a national
confrontational situation.
To sum up those ideas I would say that
basically the West has scored a spectacular and catastrophic
own goal. It has done lasting damage to its interests. They
are not going to be easily redeemable and the new era that
Mr Bush, Mr Blair and Condelezza Rice has indeed arrived but
it is not going to give them any of the benefits they
expected. And that is the worse outcome of all.
*George
Joffe is
a Research Fellow at the Centre of International Studies,
University of Cambridge and Visiting Professor of Geography
at Kings College, London University. He specialises in the
Middle East and North Africa and is currently engaged in a
project studying connections between migrant communities and
transnational violence in Europe. He is also a lecturer on
the Centre's M.Phil. in International Relations.
**
Nazar Abboud is a journalist from South Lebanon,
living in London for 20 years. He holds a degree in English
Literature from the Lebanese University which he obtained in
1982. He covered Lebanese and Middle Eastern affairs with
frequent visits to the region. He had also covered
extensively the 1982 Israeli invasion, and was the victim
of six kidnappings by Israelis and other militias factions. | 
