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Chairman:
Dr Saeed Shehabi:
We are going to discuss today one of the topical subjects
which is of concern to us all. We have benefited from these
debates over the years. We have participated in debates on
issues affecting our part of the world and our interaction
with the Western hemisphere.
Today we are
living in a world which is dominated by a superpower and
that superpower has been changing its policies over the
decades, sometimes over years and sometimes over short
periods of time. Sometimes we find it is there to support
the despotic regimes, the dictators and at other times we
hear from them that they are going to support the democratic
reforms in the Arab and Muslim world.
The debate is
still going on. Everyone is worried about what is going on
in this world. Who is really in charge of what is going on
especially in the Middle East. The Gulf is of paramount
importance to its people but also to the West. It has more
than 60 percent of the world's oil reserves and it has
functioned over the past 50 years to produce the very
necessary component that is needed by the Western world:
factories, livelihood all depend on oil. Oil has remained
the most central element in the industrialization and the
technological advancement of the world.
But what is
the Gulf? Is just a place where there is a abundance of oil
hidden under the ground. Or is it more than that? Does it
have people? Do these people have aspirations? What do they
want? Do they really want to be just consumers and living a
luxurious life style. I heard before I came that a person
from Qatar has bought a special telephone number for $2.7
million because the number is nice. But dose this really
reflect reality? Are the people of the Gulf so rich? Are
the people in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, downtown Doha or Oman
so well off that they have millions to spend on private
numbers? Or are they living as anyone in the world,
struggling to gain their own livelihood through their own
sweat and hard work.
There is
money, there are petrol dollars but are they being
distributed evenly among the people? Is everybody getting
the same share? What about democracy? Is there something
called reform? We have heard over the past five to ten years
of efforts to democratize the region. Next month elections
will be held in Kuwait after parliament was dissolved last
week by the newly appointed emir of the country. Elections
will be held but will they produce a democratic government?
What is democracy? It think the basic tenant of democracy is
to be able to change the government. Are our government
changeable in that region?
Dr Abdul
Hadi Khalaf
: The topic that I plan to speak about is the struggle for
democracy in the Gulf and I have three issues to address. I
hope you will help me to keep focus. The first is the recent
rise of labour activism among migrant workers in the Gulf;
second the problem of succession in the ruling families;
third obstacles that we fact in our struggle towards
democracy.
I have to
digress and make some points as background. The GCC that we
are speaking about is a group of countries: Oman, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. They are ruled by
dynastic regimes and have similar economic, demographic and
social structures. They all depend on oil for their economy,
they are ruled by tribes that have acquired legitimacy
through a number of sources. The initial one was approval by
British colonial powers as chiefdoms of the region. This
legitimacy was consolidated by discovery of oil and the
subsequent of increase of wealth. The ruling families are
ready to control distribution of that wealth.
These are the
similarities but of course there are differences:
differences in size, area, population. Iraq has 24 million
people while Qatar has 500 - 600 thousand. Bahrain is only
600 km while Saudi Arabia is one thousand times more. The
size is different but the political structure, the problems
that democratic forces face are the same.
For decades
we have had patrimonial regimes that stood in international
politics as almost unique. It is difficult to understand why
the Gulf ruling regimes could sustain stability although
the whole region was coming into changes from the 50s,. 60s
and 70s. These were changes that brought revolutions, civil
wars etc but the Gulf maintained its stability. It was
almost an oddity.
This
exceptional situation was explained by different factors.
One of those was the regional role that these regimes
played in the cold war, providing through their wealth and
prestige some buffer against drastic changes in the region.
They could interfere in Egypt, Sudan and Syria and a number
of other places, including far away places like Italy in
1975 to help maintain stability and the balance of America
in the cold war.
This was part
of the stability. Money accrued from oil also played its
part in enabling the regimes to buy support. Support was
easy to make. It did not touch the people but it gave people
services like education and social infrastructure that made
life easy and compared to the rest of the region quite
tolerable. This reduced the pressure from the population
against the regime. The third source is the oil money which
allowed the regimes to invest a large about of money in
infrastructure. This made the import of foreign labour,
especially from the Indian sub-continent possible.
This created
a second class labour force, a labour force that was outside
the system to, a working class that had no entitlement to
demand their rights. They were not allowed to demand their
rights because they were temporary residents and because of
the system that was defined so well that no migrant workers
can be secure of his or her employment. This employment can
be terminated within six months or at any point.
We have seen
this. In 1973 In Bahrain we carried labour organisation as
part of the struggle and we managed to organise foreign
workers and Bahrainis in common actions. One of these was in
the dry docks where we had the strange situation of 400
Pakistanis in the dry docks from Karachi and 70 Bahrainis.
There was an argument to give the same wages to the
Pakistanis. It was a very selfish argument on the part of
the Bahrainis. If the Bahrainis are more expensive than the
Pakistanis then we will get more Pakistanis. So let them be
our equal.
This was a
successful experience and the regimes all over the Gulf
learned from this. Since then they have split the labour
market so you do not get an over concentration of workers
from the same nationality in the same region. You will get
Pakistanis but you will get some people from Lahore and some
from Quetta in the same work place so the ability for them
to co-operate is reduced.
The presence
of foreign workers in the whole are provided the locals with
an illusion of superiority. We are better than the rest.
Even the poor could employ a foreign maid or find themselves
better paid than their co-workers.
The factors
that maintained security came to an almost abrupt stop. The
stop occurred in relation to September 11. It was a
combination of factors but after September 11 the ruling
families realised that hitherto they had done well but now
there is a stop. Our role as a regional factor in the cold
war is coming to and end, there is no cold war. The
mismanagement of the economy, endemic corruption, wasteful
investment has meant that even the wealth that was accrued
from oil production has also become weakened and weakened
the regime's ability to disperse benefits.
Oil revenues
also zigzagged. We had fluctuations in the oil market that
forced the regimes like Saudi Arabia to borrow billions of
dollars, externally and domestically during the past two
years.
The regimes
came to realise that the happy fairy story they had been
living has come to an end and they should consider a general
overhaul of their systems. This awareness was quite evident
even from Bush senior when he claimed that the liberation of
Kuwait would launch a period of democratization in the Gulf
and will bring more awareness of human rights etc
I believed
senior Bush myself so immediately after the end of the
Kuwait war I took the first available plane to Bahrain and I
was not allowed in because the government did not believe
him either. But many people in the region believed that now
the regimes are weakened because of the changes in the
geo-political context and their control of the economy is
not as great as it was.
I will ask
you to think again about September 11 because for the Gulf
this is a historical flash point. From the rulers'
perspectives this threshold was evident as they were now
being questioned as the true allies of the United States.
They policies boomeranged and they introduced some of those
hated terrorists that attacked the USA and exposed the great
super power as a weak state.
The second
factor was the launching of the United States Partnership.
Here was a policy, a road map, something that the Americans
want to do to us. It is no longer the case that domestic
affairs are ours and foreign policy in the Americans. They
will now interfere in how we manage our economy, our
educational system etc
This is for
the whole Gulf. I am not just talking about Saudi Arabia.
They rulers of the six GCC countries found themselves facing
something that they had never seen before, something that
questions their very existence and asks them to reform and
demands reforms. The requests and demands were coming from
two separate places: one domestically demanding reform, we
now have to get something for our sacrifices, for the losses
of our welfare and also from the USA the patron of these
regimes.
External and
internal critics of the regimes have different agendas but
the timing coincided. Different issues were demanded: the
right to participate in politics and to be citizens. The
idea of becoming a citizen in the Gulf had never been
discussed. Now it is one of the hot topics that is discussed
in most newspapers in different ways all the GCC countries.
How to change our status from being subjects to becoming
citizens. We have been subjects now we want to be citizens
with all the entitlements that citizenship can entail.
For the
external patron, especially the United States, the issues
were naturally different. They wanted to make the regimes
more palatable and acceptable in order to decrease the risks
of instability. Even hardliners within the ruling families
came to the realization that they had to something and
accept reforms. But there were a number of issues that the
disagreed on within the ruling families themselves. The
disagree on how urgent the reforms are and to what extent
they should be pushed.
Since
September 11 all observers outside and inside are in
agreement that the ruling families are now convinced and
aware that they cannot afford to procrastinate and delay.
They have to do something to show that their intention to
reform are real. But between declaring the intention to
reform and actually reforming is a long way to go. We have
yet to see concrete measures and steps. We have seen steps
of reform in Bahrain but those steps did not survive more
than a few months until they were exposed as cosmetic
changes and public relations exercises.
So what are
the obstacles for these regimes to democratize or to
introduce real reforms. Students of the area can list a lot
of factors. We have several contributors in this book that
Saeed Shehabi and I co-edited and there you will note that
the issues, the factors why the Gulf is not democratizing
can be taken from Pakistan, from Trinidad from anywhere due
to the weakness of civil society. The Gulf civil society is
weak, is it affected by confessionalism, tribalism and
ethnic divisions.
The second
factor is the absence of national feeling, national
belonging and national identity. You have the other factor
that is thrown at you every time you discuss democracy in
the third world, that is the lack of a democratic culture.
This applies to discussions about Trinidad as much as
Bahrain.
Now I will
concentrate on another factor: why democracy and reform is
not attempted as quickly and as seriously as we would like,
namely the conflicts within the ruling families. The ruling
families are not in agreement about reforms. There are
hopes. They all agree that the ruling family should survive
but some of them would accept that reforms are necessary for
their survival. Some think they can hold out.
This is a
serious factor because when you look at the six countries
they are hit by severe conflicts within the ruling family,
conflicts that are so serious ( as in the Kuwaiti example)
that they have to take so many days to come to an agreement
on who will be the next ruler, as was the case in January.
Now this has led to the dissolution of the Kuwaiti
parliament.
I will sum up
that the problem they are facing with a metaphor of P
Huntington made some 35 years ago on the kings dilemma. To
paraphrase the Kings dilemma of a reformer king - how to
reform without loosing power. How to reform without
encouraging domestic opponents from demanding more.
We having
ruling families that are facing a dilemma on three fronts:
first there is the fear and apprehension that if they
concede to the demands of their domestic opposition or if
they succumb to external pressures, they will open the gates
for a flood that may sweep their regimes. You never know
what will happen. Concessions will empower their domestic
opponents. We have seen evidence of this in Bahrain, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. The only opponents will only ask for more
because if they see a sign of weakness they will force us to
do more.
They also
know that they cannot delay reforms. They have to make the
reforms. Procrastination is not only dangerous, it can also
lead to expanding the networks of domestic opposition and
may create alliances between domestic and external
opposition.
Here we have
factors against two wills. If we give in they will ask for
more but we cannot delay matters anymore.
The third
thing they know is that if they attempt serious reforms
there will be serious conflicts within the ruling family. It
is simply because the ruling family is not like that in
Britain or Sweden. Being a member of the ruling family means
power, wealth and the ability to accumulate more wealth
and more power. The case was here that during the debate in
Kuwait on women's rights we have seen the split within the
ruling family between those who opposed reforms and they
were such powerful persons as the Chief of the National
Guard, the Chief of State Security were among the
opponents. The chief of State Security in fact went on live
televised talk show and attacked the government for giving
it to the reformers on women's rights. He considered it an
illicit deal. He later apologised for his attack but the
point was made that this is one of several anecdotal
evidences that the matter is serious.
We have
details of the situation in Bahrain. There is some split
between the king and his uncle, the prime minister. It is
not a split between two persons but between two factions in
the ruling family. Similar things can be said about Saudi
Arabia and about the UAE.
The problems
that are generated by internal conflicts within the ruling
family is seen all over the region. The only one that has no
such problem is Oman and the reason for that is simple. Oman
has the smallest ruling family, it is not as entrenched or
deeply involved in the economy as other ruling families in
the Gulf but also because the Abu Said in Oman are the
smallest in number. Another factor is that Sultan of Oman
has concentrated all power in his hand. There is no
competitor to him within his family. So internal squabbles
within the Omani ruling family can be counted out.
In Bahrain
squabbles between the ruling family are serious. I mentioned
the king and his prime minister. You can see this in daily
life. Sometimes farcical things happen. This bridge is for
the king, this hospital is for the prime minister and
competing projects. Some have no economic or investment
values but reflect the competition between them. Who will
put his hand on which island to be his private island.
Competition about these resources in also competition about
power and control. Control of wealth is also control of how
this wealth is dispersed.
We have seen
the Kuwaiti example and I mentioned the number of senior
members of the Al Sabah family that are put on each side.
This did some good in Kuwait. It was exposed in January and
because it was exposed and they couldn't even settle it,
the factions of the ruling families came to a deadlock and
had to seek help from parliament. That was the only thing
that came out of it: giving parliament a role in settling
disputes within the ruling family.
Qatar is more
serious, although it has a small population there is a major
American military base there. The problem succession in
Qatar has been chronic for generations. For the last seventy
or eighty years there has not been a ruler who came through
normal succession - there has always been some sort of coup
d'etat. In fact the latest ruler of Qatar made a coup d'etat
against his own son - and father ! His son was the crown
prince and he deposed him and appointed another son.
This is not
exotic news. It frightens me because each of these persons
has his allies, his supporters within the ruling family. The
father tried to rally his supporters to launch a counter
coup but he failed. I don't know if the deposed crown prince
will try but the chances are there.
Saudi Arabia
will be the most serious of all because the youngest in
line to being crown prince is past 65. Now they have to
settle something. The Al Saud family has to come to an
agreement on how to settle their succession problem
otherwise the defacto states will be established in parts of
Saudi Arabia. Now each governorate is ruled almost on its
own with the absolute of the governor to run domestic
affairs Each of the governors are sons of Ibn Saud or King
Abdul Aziz and these governors might try to establish their
absolute power once a conflict is prolonged.
To me the
ruling families in the Gulf and their squabbles is the most
serious because now we have come back to the ethnic
conflict, to the weakness of civil society, confessionalism
and tribalism. These are fed by factions within the ruling
families. Each ruling family tries to recruit allies from
the tribes and ethnic groups and members of the civil
society. Emirs and princes are competing with each other
recruiting allies within each of these corporations, tribes
and ethnic groups. There is a serious split within tribes as
a reflection of competition between princes and emirs.
But there are
some major signs of hope. The major sign of hope is
international interest. International interest is a major
sign of hope. It is a different types of international
interest by governments even Bush and Blair and the like.
They push for some reforms which suit their own agendas but
they are putting pressure on the ruling families to make
concessions.
The second
source of international interest is by the media. Now we
have a major presence of the major media channels in the
region. We have also the fantastic grown of the blog, webs
and all the information that IT has provided us. This
creates a media revolution and our news our exposed and
broadcast.
The third
source of international interest is the international NGO's.
I am not talking of the admirable work of Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. Both are admirable.
Now the International Labour Organisation is getting
interested. We have for ages tried to get them interested in
the region.
This comes to
the second source of hope: the rise of the activism of
foreign labour in the Gulf. Foreign labour in the Gulf,
migrant workers are more active now. You have probably heard
and read of riots and strikes and sit ins organised in
Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar by foreign workers.
Sometimes what you have heard is only part of the story.
The other side of the story is the trade unionizing of these
workers by people who come to organize them from their home
countries.
The third
element of social hope is the rise of elite activism. Our
elites, hundreds of people - women, intellectuals and
academics, even government employees are getting more active
and encouraged by the general atmosphere and relying on the
loop holes that conflicts between princes provide.
The fourth
element is grass roots activism which is not evident all
over the place. It is evident in Bahrain, Kuwait and in the
eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia where you see people
organizing themselves in a non-traditional manner that we
have not experienced before. In Bahrain they have beaten the
politicos like me and the ulemas.
* Abdulhadi Khalaf
is Senior
Lecturer in Sociology of Development at Lund University.
After getting his PhD in 1972, he was elected as a member of
Bahrain's parliament in 1973-4. He worked as a senior
researcher and consultant at Team International, Beirut; the
Arab Development Institute, and UN-ESCWA. His current
research interest is the role of NGOs in the democratization
processes in the Gulf region. His most recent publication is
included in the Swedish language anthology ‘Social
Movements.’ His published books in Arabic include ‘Conditions
and needs of Working Women in Bahrain' (1983), ‘Civil
Resistance’ (1986), and ‘State-Building in Bahrain’
(2004). His publications in English include The
Unfinished Business – State Building in Bahrain,
(2001). | 
