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*Dr
Laith Kubba
A lecture
delivered to the Gulf Cultural Club on September 2nd,
2004
Chairman: Dr
Saeed Shehabi:
There is no
hotter subject than Iraq. This has been the case for the
past 20 years. Since the first Gulf War of 1980 Iraq has
always been a hotspot. It has always attracted the interest
of politicians, journalists and researchers. Iraq has been
the kernel of civilisation for thousands of years. During
the time of the Abbasids it was the centre of the Islamic
state. It has been an important player in international
politics ever since and in the past three years it has
become much stronger in terms of importance and
significance.
It is a
regional power that is undoubtedly one of the largest few in
the region. It is a country of very complicated politics,
diverse in terms of ethnicity, religious attachments etc For
more than 30 years Iraq was ruled by the Baath Party and
this party has changed the landscape of politics in the
country. It has also affected regional alliances and
attitudes towards the West especially. During the 70s it was
a pro-Soviet satellite. In the 80s it became very much
supported by the United States during the war with Iran and
then it turned out to be very anti-American and the
Americans decided to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.
So what is this country? Why is it like that? Why do we
have to talk about Iraq every year, every decade every
century?
Today we are going to discuss that issue : Iraq: How stable?
How democratic? We have our good friend one of the people
who is well known to us all and is well informed about the
country. He has struggled against the regime of Saddam
Hussein for the past 35 years, he did not support the war
against Saddam, he did not like Saddam Hussein and he did
not join the modern politics of Iraq. Why? We can ask him
and listen to his views.
Today after the developments of recent months Dr Kubba will
give his views on Iraq. Are we going to see democracy as
President Bush has told us? Or are we going to see a
fragmented country that will be difficult to unite? Or will
it be a formidable force like it was in the past?
Dr Laith
Kubba:
Thank you Saeed for this kind introduction and thank you all
for coming. Usually I complain when I am given 40 minutes to
speak. It is too long. What can one say in 40 minutes? But I
think on Iraq maybe that is not the case because there is so
much that needs to be looked at carefully. It is not an
event that has happened and is being reflected on. It is
happening now and is affecting many countries. The events
in Najaf absolutely shocked the Shias. Muslims in general
are astonished when they look at what is happening in Iraq
today. The event is too big to be brushed aside with
superficial talk and I will go into detail.
Surprisingly
enough everybody says we have a stooge government and that
the occupation is still there. But the reality is that
legally and technically sovereignty is back in the hands of
the Iraqis. In theory, at least, the Iraqis have the right
and the power to ask the Americans to leave. Worse, if you
look carefully at America’s strategy in Iraq, today you are
going to see a much different strategy than what they had in
mind a year ago. What is more frightening is the other
possibility that the Democrats might come into office and
with the team that is building up around John Kerry one can
also establish a sense of where his administration will go
on Iraq.
By all
indicators, Iraq is not in good shape. Four lines of
argument can be presented. One is what to expect next if we
want to project a time line from now until six months or a
year ahead. What do we expect will happen in the year to
come? The second thing is what options does Iraq as a
country have and the main players: the Kurds, the Shias, the
Sunnis, the government itself, the political elites, the
political parties who are in government and Iraq as a
country. What options do they have? How do they proceed
bearing in mind how things are. What are the key fundamental
issues that are ahead of Iraq? There is also the issue of
what went wrong and who is responsible for it.
Does Iraq
have hope. I think it is a diminishing hope. It is still
there but the odds are against it. The way events are going
it is most unlikely that Iraq is going to be stable in the
next six months. I say this based on the following
assessments:
Firstly, t he
government that Iraq has at the moment is a weak government
– it is not a strong government despite the high-pitched
rhetoric that one hears from the Ministers of the Interior
and Defence, despite the might of the American army behind
all decision-making in Iraq, the government in Iraq is
indeed a weak one. It is built on a very fragile coalition,
dominated by the Kurds to a great deal and its chances of
survival are not very high bearing in mind the challenges
that they have to face. It is unlikely they will deliver
minimum services as people anticipate, it is unlikely that
they win public confidence. They had good will initially but
this disappeared quickly and by and large as a government I
do not see it as being able to live up to the tasks that lie
ahead.
What is more
frightening is that there is no alternative to it – not yet
at least. Despite all these weaknesses of the government
when you look ahead you just do not see even the beginning
of an alternative emerging on the horizon. This leaves Iraq
in a very difficult situation. If you look at the political
parties forming the government they are mainly exiles, they
have not managed to reinvigorate themselves, they have not
managed to tap on the new human resources and they have
not managed to link themselves to mainstream Iraqis. The
exiled political parties were not mass based, they were not
very strong, they have a good name, a good record, good
leaders and personalities but they do not have the machinery
to make them root themselves in Iraq. None of these groups
have presented a political programme. They have left their
finger prints on nearly every public building belonging to
the Baath Party, claiming it. Most of these buildings are
manned by one or two guards, given to a few people to run
but in reality there are no branches to these parties. So
when you look at the political parties which might give hope
to the country again you do not see much hope.
Where are the
political elites that one can look to in Iraq? By and
large Iraq’s middle class, the educated people, the class
that one normally expects will take a lead and provide a
vision for the country, remains by and large dormant and
frightened by the spread of violence in the country,
suffering constant bleeding either through terror and
assassination or through immigration. Nothing has come out
of Iraq’s middle classes in terms of a political party or a
plan. Lots of initiatives, lots of groups but nothing has
come out yet to articulate a vision or a programme for the
country.
Iraq has a
time bomb and that is the millions of deprived. Under
Saddam Hussein they suffered most during the ten or more
years under sanctions. The endless followers of Moqetada
Al Sadr come from the slums, from the real heartland areas
in Iraq. Those people not only have nothing to lose. They
have heard about the billions of dollars that have been
pumped into Iraq’s economy but they have not seen any
benefits yet. They hear that $8.8 billion are unaccounted
for or missing and they haven’t seen $10 million being spent
in their neighbourhoods. Crime is rampant in these
districts, a high level of ignorance and a very fertile
ground for extreme and radical politics exists. I do not
see that either the political parties, the middle classes or
the Iraqi government have reached out to, cultivated or
appealed to those important, deprived classes in Iraq.
So looking
purely domestically at the challenges ahead of the Iraqi
government one can see all these points on the negative
side. Are there any on the positive side? Is there any
glimpse of hope? Yes despite the chaos Iraq enjoys freedom,
freedom that is clouded with terror and violence. But there
is a level of freedom. There is a growing independent
press in Iraq. There are increasing numbers of associations
in nearly every sector. They are not very well directed or
guided but it is a reality that is growing and spreading.
All these pockets give hope and beef up the stability of
the future. But the odds against them are high.
Recently last
week a national assembly was established and yesterday a
president was announced to that assembly. Elections are due
to take place in January. These, without question, are
positive, constructive moves. But will they deliver
stability to Iraq? There was hope. When I said that hope was
diminishing one concrete example is the National Assembly.
Everyone knew that sovereignty and transition to an Iraqi
government under UN auspices was going to be difficult and
full of holes. The idea was, as Ibrahimi said, that this
assembly would provide a forum for all Iraqis – those who
are opposing the government and those who are with the
government – to meet and develop their agenda and argue
their differences. But the country ought to have a framework
other than the government. Any government is not expected to
please all its citizens and all its communities but there
ought to be an assembly, a house where representatives from
other communities, other groups who are not represented in
the government ought to be. The request to extend the
deadline for holding the assembly was so that it would be
inclusive and that is exactly what the UN wanted to see.
Unfortunately
this did not happen and we have ended up with an assembly
that has left one important community, by and large,
feeling unrepresented. That is the tribal Sunnis. Even
though there are many members who seem to be from tribal
Sunni areas they can hardly be called representatives.
The assembly
is a necessity to Iraq and the process is more important
than the outcome. But the process by itself did not manage
to pass the minimum requirement and that is to be
inclusive. So we what we are left with is no political
framework for Iraq to proceed to election day. Most likely
elections will be democratic by a large number of people.
It is most likely that violence will continue and might
cause a delay of two- three months. But I guess that
elections will be held because of the way they have been
designed. All of Iraq will be treated as a single district.
The distribution of seats will be based on proportional
representation to different states. Practically it is going
to mean that the assembly will be disproportionate and in
favour of the Kurds.
All of Iraq
will be taken as a single district. Assume that there will
be ten million voters, assume that there are two million
Kurdish voters, one million minority voters, two million
Sunni voters and five million Shia voters. Excuse me for
using these to describe the politics of the country but
because of the way it has been designed it is going to be
polarised. People are going to vote based on their ethnic
and religious identities.
If the
election is going to be boycotted by a million or so Sunnis
it means that instead of having a twenty percent
representation if all of them turned up we will have only
ten percent. Assuming in the Shia areas for whatever reason,
out of fear of violence, apathy or for any other reason
people do not show up and you have a 40 – or 50 percent
turnout it means that instead of having out of the five
million 50 percent representatives from that area you are
going to have 25 – 30 percent. Most likely because the
Kurdish areas are secure and organised and because the
Kurds are determined to make their national stand it is
expected that there will be a very high turnout on election
day. So the two million Kurds, although in theory they ought
to have 20 percent of the vote, effectively because of the
weak turnout in the other areas of Iraq, the Kurds will
make up a disproportionate 40 percent of the elected body.
On top of
that is their strong influence because Iraq has no army. The
only national army so to speak that exists in Iraq today are
the peshmergas not only in terms of numbers and organisation
but also in terms of the hardware they posses. Add to that
their intelligence networks throughout the country. For over
ten years they more or less enjoyed an autonomous region
while Iraq was under sanctions. They managed to build up
institutions, not only political and media, but many of them
to do with intelligence and armed units. Today their
influence in Baghdad is not visible in the day to day
running of affairs but on occasions such as the National
Assembly it becomes very visible. The National Assembly,
supposedly made up of a majority of Arabs, ends up electing
a Kurdish president.
I think my
colleagues the Kurds very much modelled their post-war
politics on what the Tajiks did in Afghanistan and this was,
as they were told, the price for staying in Iraq. They would
have more privileges and more benefits.
Can Iraq be
stable if the Sunnis are more or less excluded and tilting
so much in favour of one community, the Kurds, with a weak
and divided Shia house in the country? My guess is not.
There are at two neighbouring countries, if not three, that
are longing to project a strong influence on Iraqi politics.
One of them is Iran. It is a Shia country and Iraq is the
largest Shia Arab country. For Shiism which is deeply
rooted in Islam and Islam has its history more or less in
Arabia, that link is critical in Iraq. If Iraq was to be
weakened and if the Shias of Iraq were to be marginalised
the Shias and Shiism would loose a vital bridge not only to
the Arab world but also to the rest of the Muslim world. So
it is critical for Shiism and its future to have strong and
stable Shia conditions in Iraq.
This is on
the religious side. Without question Iran is a country that
has based its future on the concept of vilat al fikh
and there is a lot of emphasis on how the merga, the
highest Shia religious authority, view the politics of the
day. Imagine a country as powerful as Iran that has based
itself on that doctrine facing more or less a strong,
influential, merga based in another country that can
project power and influence over Iran. Without question this
is going to affect Iran and Iran has not only religious but
also political interests in Iraq. This is without touching
on the normal issues such as the Iraq-Iran war and all the
issues that are related to it.
A second
country that will have an important influence on Iraq is
Saudi Arabia again for more or less the same reasons. Saudi
Arabia is a country where religion plays a leading role and
the Salafi school is dominant not only in the state but,
more importantly, in nearly every sector in society. Saudi
Arabia would not be that comfortable in seeing a thriving,
Shia-dominated state along its borders. It not only has
traditional religious issues that it has to deal with but it
also has a large Shia community in Saudi Arabia.
A third
country that has strategic interests in Iraq, and whose
national security would be affected by what happens in
Iraq, is Turkey. For all intents and purposes as I look at
the politics of the Kurds, they are heading towards one of
either destinations: They could more or less dominate
Iraq like it was dominated before under Saddam Hussein
through Saddam’s tribe who were in a minority but managed to
gain dominance throughout the country. They could take the
position of policing Iraq and being sub contracted by other
countries to do so. Or they are heading towards
independence. There is a strong current among the Kurds that
would like to see independence. My assessment is that it is
only a matter of time before a Kurdish state is established
in Iraq.
Where does
that leave different players in Iraq? Where are we heading?
Is there hope? So far I have been speaking from a
perspective of an analyst
I will sum up
by trying to give a prescription rather than just an
analysis of what is going on in Iraq. To touch on the
question which Saeed raised, I have worked on Iraqi politics
for a long time and I think as we have got involved in a
post-Saddam period my focus has been more on the policy
rather than on the politics of Iraq. My focus has been on
trying to identify what approach the country and the
political players should take concerning the national
interest rather than simply defining politics as power and
position and this is what the political groups have been
doing in the last year - fighting over power and position
without programmes and developing policy options.
The
priorities for Iraq are first of all to restore stability.
It is impossible it seems that we can restore stability
while foreign troops are inside the country. Conditions must
be created for the foreign troops to leave. The only way for
that agenda to emerge is to recall the Iraqi army but not
exactly as it was. There are ways in which the Iraqi army
can be built where it will serve the nation and it will be
on the side of the people. One possible scheme that can be
implemented within four to six months that has not been
taken on board is for 18 units of the army to be called back
in the 18 different provinces. There are officers and
soldiers in every province – people who are born and raised
in that province who served in the Iraqi army and are
fully acceptable in their respective provinces. They come
from the same towns, they would not fire on the people in
their cities. By recalling and rebuilding these units
purely from the budget that Iraq has these units of 5,000
each can be assembled quickly, armed and used as national
guards for each province to give back up to the local
police and security that is there and more or less to
relieve those foreign troops from staying.
But there is a
fear that an emerging Iraqi army will take full side with
the national sentiment and we will end up with a government
more or less nationalist. It will not fire against the
people, it will not throw bombs on Najaf and it will not
fire in a big way against the Iraqi people. I see the
re-building of the Iraqi army as a pre-requisite to the
foreign troops leaving Iraq and that would create the
conditions for ending the violence in particular from those
who are calling themselves resistance and who made their
sole goal the departure of foreign troops.
The second
thing is that it is impossible to have stability in Iraq
without a framework that is genuinely inclusive of Iraq’s
three main communities. Trying to impose the political will
of one community over another is impossible. The only person
who did it was Saddam and we would need something worse than
Saddam to ensure that this would work.
So the only
way is to have a framework, a constitution, a process that
is genuinely inclusive and if after that process the Kurds
exercise their national role to separate from Iraq the
Iraqis ought to accept that. If what comes out of that is a
new form of unity or reconfiguration of Iraq one ought to
accept that and proceed. The Iraqis cannot afford to
continue marginalising one community or continue taking
advantage of one community’s weakness over others.
For Iraq to
function as a state it has to be modern. The plurality that
exists in Iraq requires a modern state, a state that is run
on decentralised powers and elevates the public functions of
the state above religion and ethnicity. We cannot have a
Shia-Sunni-Kurd division of office and power in a country as
complex as Iraq and Iraq really needs to move quickly to
develop the infrastructure of the country.
For Iraq to
proceed we must have an agreed approach on how to get rid of
the heavy burden of Saddam’s 35 years of injustice and
crimes and the one year burden of the occupation. Both have
burdened Iraq and the Iraqi government. There ought not to
be a turning of the page and proceeding as if nothing had
happened. There ought to be an agreement on how to clear up
the legacy of the past.
*Dr Laith
Kubba is senior program officer for the Middle East and
North Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy. He
worked for the past decade as an independent opposition
figure. Dr Kubba trained as a geotechnical engineer. In the
nineties he worked as director for public relations at the
Al-Khoei Foundation. A founding member and initial convenor
of the Iraqi National Congress he has been closely involved
in Iraqi political affairs in exile and since 1990. He has
been a contributor to international forums and the media. He
also served as director of Al-Aalam, an Arabic
language weekly and Africa Events, an English
language monthly. | 
