The Crises of Political Reforms in Bahrain

A lecture delivered to the Gulf Cultural Club

By Dr Abdul Hadi Khalaf*

On 20^th May, 2004

 Good evening and thanks for coming.

 I am pleased to be here. My previous visit to this place was two years ago. I presented then the main points of my paper to a conference organized by the British Society for Middle East Studies.

 In that paper I discussed a 35-year old proposition by Samuel P Huntington. In the King’s Dilemma Huntington proposed that an absolute monarch seeking to modernize and reform his regime faces a major dilemma - a balancing act - to use a more familiar phrase. A modernizing absolute monarch has to reconcile the demands of his opposition without alienating his own traditional power-base.

 Two years ago King Hamad of Bahrain seemed to be grappling with a similar dilemma i.e. how to appease his opposition without alienating the old guards within his own ruling family. Admittedly this has not been a simple matter of choosing between equally painless alternatives. And, unfortunately, King Hamad has failed to become the reformer-king he hoped to be.

 The muted celebrations of Hamad's 5th anniversary, last March, was overshadowed with indications that he has either has lost interest in his own reform project or that he has succumbed to the will of his own uncle Khalifa bin Salman, the country's prime minister since Bahrain became independent from Britain in 1971.

 This is a truly sad turn of events for a person who managed to convince nearly all his opponents to support his vision for reforms in Bahrain soon after he assumed power in March 1999. His blue print for those reforms was put to a referendum in February 2001 and he gained the approval of 98 percent of votes from Bahraini men and women.

 That impressive voter approval reflected the popular expectation that Hamad would live up to his pledges of reforms, including easing restrictions on freedom of expression and association, lifting travel restrictions on dissidents, abrogating state security laws and granting full citizenship rights to women.

 For a while things were promising - there was a series of amnesties, Bahrain's jails were emptied of political prisoners and hundreds of political exiles were allowed to return together with their families.

 This was a major achievement for a ruler who was at first dismissed as indecisive. During the first two years of his rule, Sheikh Hamad seemed eager to please everyone. His speeches were adequately laced with all the key words one might expect from a reforming autocrat.  This may explain the fact that Bahrain is held up as a model for some reform-minded members of other ruling families in the gulf.  Although none of these, with the exception of the Saudis, have signalled any urgency, they have in their different ways, signalled a willingness to reform, including granting a greater role to local elites.

 The state of national euphoria generated by Hamad’s early conciliatory gestures was overtaken by subsequent developments. Within a year after the referendum Hamad declared himself a King and upgraded Bahrain to a modern democratic and constitutional monarchy. On the same day Hamad decreed a new constitution, marking the end of a period of a transition - a period of searching for a resolution to his own royal dilemma.

 Hamad simply choose to solve the Hungtingtonian king's dilemma by closing the ranks of the royal family in the face of the escalating demands by opposition groups. Hamad's reforms are distinctly seen as a model of the kind of measures that could be introduced without requiring any of the ruling family to give up any of its dynastic privileges.

 The appeal of Hamad's model is enhanced by the generous praise lavished on him by Western officials, upholding Bahrain's image as a regional model. Unfortunately for King Hamad and for the people of Bahrain, he has taken a u-turn almost immediately after that astounding approval rating at the referendum.

 One can of course speculate whether Hamad took this u-turn willingly or under pressure from the old guards within his family, including his uncle and prime minister. The new constitution (February 2002) places several constraints upon parliament's role as a counterweight to the executive branch. This constitution divides parliament into two chambers with equal powers: the directly elected Council of Deputies, and the Shura Council whose members are appointed by the king.

 The constitution allows deputies to prepare proposals for draft laws but it is the government alone that can bring draft laws to vote and as an extra measure of control, the king retains the final word in any legislative disputes.

 An additional royal edict was issued to forbid parliament from deliberations on any action taken by the executive branch prior to December 14, 2002, the date of parliament's inaugural session.

 This is one of 56 royal edicts issued by King Hamad during the few months preceding the opening of parliament.

 Under the new constitution the king is "the protector of religion and homeland", "symbol of national unity". He is Head of State, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and the Head of the executive legislative and judicial branches. And, he may amend the constitution and propose laws. He is also the authority for their ratification.

 This is probably one of the reasons for Lord Avebury, a long-time observer of Bahrain, to remark that the absolute monarch's of medieval Europe would have "given their eyes and teeth for the powers held by King Hamad.

 On October 24th, 2002 the first parliamentary elections since 1973 were held in Bahrain - four main political organisations called for a boycott. The 53.4 percent turnout paled in comparison to the figure of over 98 percent at the referendum 18 months earlier.

 The boycott signalled a definite end of early hopes of a smooth and speedy process of reform. More alarming perhaps it is also a signal that the country has reached the threshold of a political and constitutional crisis.  The situation was not helped by the perception that the king had definitely taken a turn on reforms.

 One can speculate, of course, on whether the king has simply changed his mind or that he has succumbed under pressure from the old guards within the ruling family.

 The problems facing Bahrain are not simply the results of the unilaterally proclaimed constitution. King Hamad has made several blunders.  Some are due to over confidence in his abilities as a tactician, while others are due to miscalculations and bad advice or folly.

 These blunders compound the severity of the crises of political reforms in Bahrain.

 I will provide some examples:

 First, the issue of impunity granted by the king to officials who allegedly have committed crimes and violations of human rights in the past.  Thousands of former political prisoners and exiles and hundreds of alleged victims of torture are left with no possibility of redress.

 Second the issue of "political/collective naturalisation" extending full citizenship to several thousands from Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Syria. Some of these people are lured by the promise of citizenship to serve in Bahrain's military and security forces.

 Third, the issue of the rampant past and current corruption which in the eyes of many is epitomised by the king's own uncle, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman, the country's strongman for nearly four decades.

Issues of corruption and mismanagement were dramatically highlighted recently by the news of the impending collapse of two government-managed pension funds. Since nearly all-Bahraini employees in the private and public sectors are clients to those two funds, the outrage was widespread and highly vocal.

The matter was taken up by parliament in an obvious effort to cast of its image as window dressing.

Following nearly twelve months of parliamentary investigations and debate, including the summoning of three ministers for questioning by the Council of Deputies, the matter was effectively shelved although it was established that the two funds lost "hundreds of millions of dinars" and that the two funds could be declared insolvent by the year 2007. In the process, the credibility of parliament was effectively erased.

 Fourth is the issue of human rights. Throughout the past two years one can discuss an accelerating decline in the area of human rights.  The decline was initially symbolic and in separate incidents but it has been a sustained decline.

For the past four months government measures have taken their toll culminating in the arrest of human rights activists, repeated public official threats to opposition groups, repeated threats to declare human rights groups and centres illegal, banning public meetings organised by opposition groups (including an amateur theatre group).

 The fifth example is the untouched and uncontrolled privileges of the Al Khalifa family. This is a serious matter for any reform in the region and this is the acid test of the credibility of King Hamad and the reforms. King Hamad simply does not want the royal family to be citizens of his own country. I do not refer to formalities of citizenship, but to the sense that they assimilate within society and have rights and duties of all citizens. I devised a slogan but, unfortunately, I was not taken seriously when I was in Bahrain: Let us call for the assimilation of the royal family in Bahrain into society. The al-Khalifa have remained adamant about their separation from the rest  - even physically by living alone in their own town  and by their massive control of the resources in the country.

 I will now touch on a point made by Dr Shehabi namely whether Bahrain is a model of reform for the region. Hamad’s political reforms provide the best model that royal families could wish for.  It is a model that allows a country to appear it is reforming while the ruling family continues to enjoy all its privileges, including their total control over economic resources and political institutions and their command of the armed forces and security agencies.  The model may be less appealing to other peoples of the Gulf monarchies. They may be alarmed by the mounting difficulties Hamad faces convincing his own people of his credentials as a bona fide reformer.

 To salvage Bahrain’s role as a model of political reforms in the region, King Hamad and leaders of the opposition must engage in a serious dialogue of national reconciliation.  Both sides need all the help they can get to make Bahrain a model for a peaceful transition from absolute dynastic regime into a truly constitutional, democratic and stable monarchy.