One year after - a democratic Iraq or pax Americana?

A seminar hosted by the Gulf Cultural Club and Abrar Islamic Foundation

Thursday 8th April 2004

Session One:

The Political Transition in Iraq
Lord Avebury
We have been set an impossible task, to look at Iraq one year after the war against Saddam and pick one of the two scenarios suggested by the title – a democratic Iraq or pax Americana. Those are not the only futures, nor is either of them necessarily the front runner. Yesterday’s events, which seemed to be more like bellum Americanum than pax Americana, indicate the possibility that the coalition forces may get bogged down in an escalating guerrilla war, one that brings them increasingly into confrontation with the very leaders to whom they are supposed to hand over power on June 30. We are hearing statements like that of Mr Iyad al-Azzi, of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, using the term ‘resistance’ to describe those who are fighting the Americans in Falluja; while Mr Fu'ad al-Tarfi, director of Muqtada al-Sadr's office, in Al-Najaf, says:
“The revolution and the clashes are now popular. They have to face the entire people”.
At the moment, hostility to the US occupation is the one factor that appears to unite the majority of religious and political leaders except in the Kurdish region of the north. How would this affect the nature of the sovereign authority to which power is to be handed on June 30? The Americans have said all along that there must be a move in the direction of democracy and legitimacy, even if in the circumstances it was not possible to hold elections yet because of security. They can hardly prolong the existence of the Governing Council without alteration, as the body that takes over ultimate authority from the Coalition in less than 90 days time. But if they expand the membership of the Governing Council to make it more representative, who will be prepared to take on such a thankless task? Those who have signed up to the so-called ‘resistance’ aren’t likely to prop up what they would see as an American puppet régime. And because of intimidation and fear, secular democrats and Islamic constitutionalists such as the followers of Ayatollah Sistani may prefer to stay in the background until they see how the situation develops.
This idea of a ‘resistance’ is an extremely dangerous one, having implications far beyond the frontiers of Iraq itself. It would have resonance throughout the whole region, where as we already know, there was a lot of sympathy for Saddam as a victim of American imperialism. The public in Lebanon, Jordan or Egypt, and in sections of the diaspora, would coalesce behind a simple demand that US forces leave the country at once, regardless of the chaos that would follow, and the likelihood that a dictatorship just as extreme as Saddam’s would rise out of the ruins.
The emergence of Muqtada al-Sadr as the proprietor of an armed force which is identified by the apocalyptic name of the Mahdi Army is also very troubling. You remember that at one of our previous meetings on the future of Iraq, al-Sadr was named as the man behind the assassination of Sayyed Abdul-Majid al-Khoei a year ago. After all this time, the Americans now say they will arrest al-Sadr, and they have one of his close associates Sayyid Mustafa al-Ya’qubi in custody. He replies that he has Spanish hostages, and will release them if al-Ya’qubi is freed. This is a key test of American credibility. If they fail to arrest al-Sadr and to eliminate his militia, people will see that they are unable to procure the level of security needed for any democratic process, and, worse than that, those who would have played key roles in building civil society and a democratic system would fade away as they saw that force and intimidation were the road to power, not the ballot box.
At the other end of the scale there is what I might call the Ann Clwyd school of thought. Yes, it is regrettable that 700 coalition servicemen and women, and an unknown but even larger number of Iraqi


civilians have died since President Bush announced the end of the war at the beginning of May last year, but look at the progress made towards normality. Last week at the seminar on the future of Iraq held at the al-Khoei Foundation in memory of Seyyed Abdul Majid, the US Embassy spokesman Ethan Goldrich said that 200,000 Iraqis had been enlisted in the police and civil defence corps; that a transitional law was in place guaranteeing the rights of all citizens; that municipal and provincial governments were functioning; that electricity was at pre-war levels, and that the World Bank was forecasting an increase of 33% this year in Iraq’s GDP. On this reading, we would only have to wait until these and further improvements feed through into the consciousness of the Iraqi people, the present blip in the security would fade into memory, and the Anglo-Americans would retire gracefully, to the applause of the whole Arab world.
Yet another, and rather more promising idea, is that the UN should assume a central role in Iraq, as the GCC put it today, ‘to pacify the country and restore security and stability’. As you know, the UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi is at present canvassing a broad range of views on the political transition set for the end of June. He will find out whether there is a consensus on the form of a transitional administration, how to proceed, and what would be the body to receive power from the CPA on July 1. The implication is that there might be a further interim body, that the transitional administration would not be cast in stone on July 1, but that agreed means should be set out in advance, as to how it should develop as the means of ascertaining the will of the people moves towards full elections.
The scheme originally favoured by the Americans, whereby local caucuses of the great and good would nominate representatives, was not well received, though so far no alternative has been suggested in public. It could hardly be for us, sitting here in London, to design this process, but we could say that the sooner Mr Brahimi unveils a draft which could be put before the Iraqi people for their approval, the sooner they could see that there is a way ahead for them to take power over their own affairs, which doesn’t require violent means for its implementation.
If Mr Brahimi’s plan does appear to have the endorsement of popular opinion, then surely it would receive the backing of the UN, both political in terms of a favourable resolution in the Security Council, and economic and technical, with the deployment of whatever UN experts are required, and the money to ensure that the scheme is effectively implemented. This would be the best way of ensuring the departure of coalition forces, and conversely, the use of armed force means paradoxically that the occupation will be prolonged. When the CPA vanishes on July1, the transitional administration (TA) is not likely to want independent militias to assume responsibility for security, so they would ask the coalition forces to remain.
But let us consider, as an exercise, what might happen if the TA, assuming it has the power, does ask them to leave. We have already seen that the embryo police force is incapable of standing up to al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. They would be swept aside, and the various militias would take control of their own areas, making it impossible for the central government to create any uniformity or cohesion. The worst that could happen is that Iraq would disintegrate, but more likely it would begin to resemble Afghanistan, with parts under the control of local magnates.
I said that the fallout from the present situation in Iraq would be felt in the region. Fred Halliday, who had just returned from Yemen when he attended the memorial at the al-Khoei Foundation, said that Saddam and Palestine were seen as one issue by many of the young people there. Indeed, he said that Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine and Iraq were fused together in radical Islamist thinking, and we need to be conscious of this because it is not only on the street in Sana’a that a pattern of this kind may be extending into mainstream Muslim communities. As an opinion survey in The Guardian last week put it, Muslims see themselves as in perilously unequal conflict with the world’s military powers, and that could lead to strains within our own society her in the UK.
It was President Hosni Mubarak who said that the invasion of Iraq would spawn 100 bin Ladens. When Blair and his followers say that even if there were no weapons of mass destruction, we were morally right to go to war to free the Iraqi people from the yoke of Saddam Hussein, he was ignoring all the side effects. It is too early to say whether in the long run we shall actually have delivered freedom in Iraq, but we have certainly alienated Muslims everywhere else including Britain, and made it more likely that some of our own citizens will succumb to the ideas of extremists.
I have no idea what Mr Blair will be saying when he meets President Bush next week, and some would say that it makes no difference what he says, because when it comes to the important decisions, like

disbanding the Iraqi army, our advice is ignored. In an authoritative 19-page article on the lead up to the war in the US magazine Atlantic Monthly the distinguished journalist James Fallows mentions Blair once, as attending a meeting at Camp David a month before hostilities began. It is obviously convenient for the Americans to have British troops there, and it is interesting to see that their relationships with the Iraqi people are better than the Americans. But if the Prime Minister does get a word in edgeways, what should he say?
First, we have to stick to the timetable. The Iraqis must be shown that the coalition carries out its undertakings, and that means no backing down on the commitment to hand over on June 30.
Second, there must be solid backing for the UN to be in charge of the plan to be presented by Brahimi following his consultations. That would be the best way of taking the edge off the criticism that the US means to prolong the occupation under the cloak of the transitional administration.
Third, we should support the arrest of al-Sadr and the disarming of his militia, as well as all other militias that are disturbing the peace. We should invite the support of Iraqi democrats for this process, which is an essential precursor of elections. Fourth, there must be a credible plan for elections to be held early next year.
And to sum up, the situation is bleak but not hopeless. It is bound to be influenced by electoral considerations in the US, and in the not too distant future, here as well. We were against the war, and some of our fears about the consequences are coming true. But having taken that decision, we cannot back away now. We owe it to the Iraqi people to stay the course.


The Greater Middle East initiative:
Can Iraq become beacon for regional democracy?
Adel Darwish
Can we afford to pull out of Iraq? The answer is of course not. It will set a dangerous precedent and will aid forces of change by force, military coups etc and we are back to square one.
I recently attended a conference in Qatar where a few ideas emerged about regional democracy. There was a stark difference between the sessions organized by Europeans, Chatham House and those organized by the Americans and the Council of Foreign Relations. It was obvious they see the world through American eyes as Fleet Street which is older than America itself was excluded and so was the BBC.
There was also a consensus that change must come from within as a need in the region, by the people of the region. The problem is that in most nations in the region, people whether they had past experience in democracy and representation, or those experimenting with it (Bahrain and Kuwait) and those aspiring to it, all have been demanding reform and democracy long ago, and it was the US led Western powers that aided and supported Arab despots to block reform. Saddam is a case in point. Another more recent case in point is that of Colonel Qathafi who is no longer a bad guy, and is now invited into the club, or the tent – no pun intended. However there is no evidence that human rights are improving in Libya. Neither is there reform, free speech, transparency and allowing opposition were demanded by Britain or the US before PM Blair went there.
These examples and past experience make peoples in the region distrust the Americans as to whether they are serious about democracy in the region. Hence it is crucial not to fail in Iraq or give into intimidation. But force alone is not a perfect solution either.
What has also been emerging in the past few months and consensus among participants in various gatherings including Qatar is that there are three major trends of thought or issues. They are by no means exclusive as they overlap and many believe in the three:
(1) Although the masses were led to believe that the Palestinian Israeli issue is more important than anything else for the Arabs, the consensus is that you can still reform, move towards democracy without waiting for a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
(2) Most Arab authoritarian rulers (some are dictators and some are not); all or most would like to see a big American failure in Iraq because it will put pressure on them change and democratize and will set a precedent as even when there is election observed by the whole world. I am referring to Algeria, for example. We are unlikely to see the first ruler


of an Arab nation to be ousted in the poll. Even Bouteflika’s main rival, Ali Blefis, who is the same pedigree and comes from the same stable, has been undermined by various means and rivals were made sure to be excluded on technicalities. Hence I can’t think of
many Arab rulers – except perhaps immediate neighbours like Kuwait who have a satisfied population at large. Not many Arab rulers want to see success in Iraq.
This brings me to the second point . Could Iraq then be a model of democracy in the region? Yes and no. And this brings us to the third trend: because crisis are not always a hindrance to democracy and reform. The Chinese word for crisis is also the world for opportunity. If we think of WW1 and what it brought along with WW2 and similar crisis which have resulted in more freedom and democracy.
This could also be an opportunity, although issues like security and the absence of a coherent long-term American strategy – the fact that they never had a plan B is in evidence.
It is essential we do not chicken out against the usual taboos but set an example for where election is best and when consensus is needed.
The United Nations Arab world human development programme is one of the biggest con-jobs in history. How can you group all the Arab states in one basket? There are Arabs and non-Arabs and various ethnic groups such as Egyptians, Copts, Nubians, Berbers, Kurds, Assyrians, Turegs, Turcomens, Armenians and Jews. There are different past experiences of democracy, representation, elections and civil society. Egypt has a civil society, tolerance, feminist and womens movements, parliamentarian experiences and experiments. Bahrain has a great experience in social liberalization that brought economic benefits and the brave decision by the Emir, now king, to hold elections embracing the opposition. In Lebanon there is a free press.
America and the UK have sent the wrong signals over Libya – consistency in foreign policy is needed.
We also need to examine the role of the media. Arab leaders need to be pressurized to keep their hands of the media. Most media in the region have an agenda or are working for Arab regimes who in turn want a failure in Iraq and to keep the Palestinian issue on the front pages and in the headlines are more important than other local issues and as an excuse to delay reform and democracy.



Al-Sadr: The legacy of a legendary religious leadership
Ayatullah Ali Hussain Al-Hakim
Ayatollah S. Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr was born in 1935 in the city of Kadhemayah/Baghdad Iraq. His name means a combination of the “highly praised” and “knowledgeable”. His father died while he was onlyfour years old, after which his older brother, Sayyed Isma’il raised him until the age of puberty. Under the support of his brother, Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr started studying qualifying as a Shi’ah scholar and a jurisprudent. He was known for his astute acts, noble behaviour and clever performance while attending his classes. He soon became known as a renowned thinker and a modern – Islamic thought theorist. He wrote many books in various Islamic fields, which were not touch on profoundly prior to his time. Having such an innovative mind Ayatollah Sadr wrote during the last years of his life a book dealing with the most complicated aspects of Epistemology and the philosophy of science i.e. induction. Although he severely criticised both the classical formal Aristotelian Logic and the various Western schools, one cal still say that none of his criticism denies formal logic, in favour of a total empiricism entirely. Moreover – I believe – the quintessence of formal logic is given weight by more accurate analysis and mathematical modus operandi. As such, As Sadr opened a new horizon between the modern scientific method and the postulations of the Muslim thinkers. He probed deep into the world of research, mastering his tools, armed with neutral science. While refuting one pretext with another, one proof with another and enjoying a profound understanding of the Western thinking, he was simultaneously successful in establishing the new school of philosophy of science, based on (Al-Mantiq Athati), “The Subjective Logic”, which sought a moderate way between the two schools of human thought. His work

was served as an unparalleled source of inspiration to philosophers with an innovative bent. For two millennia there has been intense division and deep gulf between the empiricists and those who adopt the Aristotelian approach, and As-Sadr’s book – by establishing this profound school – was undoubtedly the key element in the construction and preservation of a bridge between the two sides of the gulf.
The Political Arena.
When he reached the level of a qualified mujtahid, and his personality was known to have encapsulated all the necessary skills for leading his people, As-Sadr became of the main Shi’a leaders in Iraq’s modern political history. As an opponent to the Ba’thist Party he lived constantly under severe pressure. He was arrested many times, and during those periods he would be released, he has lived under acute repression from the Ba’ath Party regime. For the last two years of his life he dedicated his work closely for following and supporting the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution until he was executed. He was unequivocally the best example of an exemplary human being according to the Qur’anic teachings. The Noble Qur’an has introduced two types of people, while dealing with their attitude towards wealth and power. He mentioned Qaroun and Moses as two individuals representing differing life-styles. We read in Qur’an:
‘Surely Qaroun was of the people of Musa, but he rebelled against them, and We had given him of the treasures, so much so that his hoards of wealth would certainly weigh down a company of men possessed by great strength. When his people said to him: Do not exult: surely Allah does not love the exultant: And seek by means of what Allah has given you the future abode, and do not neglect your portion of this world, and do good (to others) as Allah has done good to you, and do not seek to make mischief in the land, surely Allah does not love the mischief-makers’.
He said: I have given this only on account of the knowledge I have. Did he not know that Allah had destroyed before him of the generations those who were mightier in strength then he and greater in assemblage? And the guilty shall not be asked about their faults.
So he went forth to his people in finery. Those who desire this world’s life said :O would that we had the like of Qaroun is given; most surely he is possessed of mighty good fortune. And those who were given the knowledge said: Woe to you! Allah’s reward is better for him who believes and does good, and none is made to receive this except the patient. Thus we made the earth to swallow up him and his abode; so he had no body of helpers to assist him against Allah nor was he of those who can defend themselves. And those who yearned for his place only the day before began to say: Ah! (know) that Allah amplifies and straitens the means of subsistence for whom he pleases of his servants: had not Allah been gracious to us, He would most surely have abased us; ah! (know) that the ungrateful are never successful. (As for) that future abode, We assign it to those who had no desire to exalt themselves in the earth nor to make mischief and the good end is for those who guard (against evil)’, (The Holy Qur’an 28:76-83).
In these Qur’anic verses one can easily detect that the Qur’an has divided man into two groups: The first, which is possessed by power, assumes it is the most important thing. The second is that of the knowledgeable ones who think it is better to be humble and to rely solely on Almighty God, as He is the one who gives, and he is the one who ultimately takes back. The pious preached to the first group who admired Qauroun. He was a cousin of Moses; but while becoming rich he went astray and became a subject of temptation and leading people to disbelieve. Here the second group is preaching to the first by saying that Allah’s (swt) reward is the most valuable cause. However money – which enables mankind to enjoy – is not forbidden as long as it functions as a means for legitimate enjoyments , no more. The purpose of this life is to seek nearness to Allah (swt) and be a master of one’s ego. The Qur’an continued emphasising that within a few minutes all of Qaroun’s possessions were swallowed up, and he remained alone and helpless. Obviously this was mentioned in order to warn us not to be absurdly pretentious and proud.
It somehow seems that these two groups are presented in the case of Iraq. As Saddam Hussein and his supporters embody the first and the late Ayatollah As-Sadr and his fellows represent the second. In one of his letters. In one of his letters, which was posthumously revealed, a few months ago, Saddam Hussain, addressing Ayatollah Sayyed M.B. As-Sadr, wrote:
“We love the scholars of Islam and do support them, as long as they don’t interfere in the governmental and political affairs, so we don’t know why you prohibited for Iraqis the membership of our party! And why you appealed to people to make an uprising against us, and supported our enemies in Iran!


As have we advised you and given you all the excuses in these matters, though you with your importunity and doggedness ignored us and rejected us. This has led us to consider you as our bitter enemy, and stubborn opponent. And you obviously know what the government’s policy towards its opponents according to the law is! Therefore we suggest – as a matter of mercy on you – that you to follow certain
things; as if you do, you will be saved for persecution, and will gain the greatest position and a big powerful posture in our eyes, where all your requirements will be fulfilled, and all your desires will be realised. But if you reject, you will have to face what is your inevitable punishment, regardless of which conditions you are in. And here we re to refer to three of these certain things, for whose fulfilment you don’t need to do more than write a few lines which would be published in the official newspapers and a televised interview, which will be arranged for you to respond to these questions. Afterwards, you shall return with honour and respect, which you have never seen or imagined in your entire life. The first thin is to declare that you are satisfied , and agree with our party and our successful revolution; secondly, to declare that you will not interfere in the political issues, while admitting that Islam has nothing to say regarding the governmental affairs; and thirdly to declare that you have abandoned your former stance i.e. supporting the Iranian regime, and that you do adopt our position towards it…etc’

One can read that the letter was formulated to warn him and at the same time to open the doors open for material seduction, and demonic promises. He expected him to obey blindly or at least of fear his threats. The late Ayatullah As-Sadr replied in an astonishingly firm tune speaking beyond this stupid formulation replying in a letter which was full of dignity and moral lessons that will definitely be considered as an eternal statement, He penned: You became an enemy of the Merciful Allah (swt) and you have launched a bitter war against him; and you are committing all the prohibited stupid matters. You are attacking all His saints and are ready to carry out anything for harming them, planning with all your sly minds to persecute them with no proofs, but evil thoughts, and then killing them due to suspicion, as you imitate your ancestors, following their steps, where nothing seems to have the power to stop you from committing the big sins and nothing can prevent you from committing the worst criminal acts… (Until he says) Did you think that you can scare me with death, or that you intimidate me with persecution to death, while dead is indeed an institution written on each and every human being? Isn’t being martyred by the most tyrannical oppressors one of the honours from Allah (swt) to his devoted servants?! Thus do what you can, and carry on your sly plans, and do your best, but you will ultimately be destroyed and your termination is the worst punishment, while you won’t succeed to diminish our cause, nor will you be able to dampen down our flame or to stultify our light… (until he says) The most surprising in your stuff is that you approach me with a cheating advice, implementing sweet words, attempting to manipulate me with your deceptive expressions to promise me the best of this worldly life given to your consent, and the rewards of this disgusting life by following your desires, asking me to sell the truth for mischief, and to exchange the consent of Almighty Allah (swt) with yours…Then, I will be definitely a looser who has gone astray. Woe to you and destruction to you. Do you think that Islam is a subject to be sold! Or that it contains some of this worldly life that can be exchanged with the highest price: you are definitely ignorant as you promise me in return a devastated life of this world!. Do you think you can warn me or try to seduce me? I swear by Allah (swt) that you won’t remain safe after my death, but will live in disgrace and fear, your matters will deteriorate and God will cause someone to control you and let you taste humiliation and degradation, and then you will be defeated and face that which you never encountered in your life of exhaustion and hardship. You will indeed remain like that until you face your worse inevitable destiny, groups of people will be liquidated in the deserts and hills until your days will be over and your power weakened, then God will destroy your throne and the fate of Sheba and you will be between those of whom you have killed and their loved ones, and those of whom who had to escape to all parts of earth, returning back to their homes, and that’s when God will bequeath the oppressed your properties, your lands and your possessions, then you will be cursed by all tongues and a black period of history.

As one reads between the lines, it is possible to understand the message intended that is the killing of such a king of human being necessitates a legendary curse, which will not allow such criminals to escape their


just fatal destiny. One is also reminded of the saying of Nostradamus when speaking about the fate of which Saddam Hussein will stumble upon referring to the Iran-Iraq war and the first Gulf war after his invasion of Kuwait, and then the last war, which led to his capture and humiliation, by the coalition forces. Hopefully he will finally face his just punishment, like all other hypocrites in history such as the Pharaohs, Yazidis and Nazis. I hope that America will not afford him the same treatment as the Iranian Shah who was welcomed in many countries until he died in Egypt. At least this is a good lesson for of us, that tyranny and injustice cannot prevail, regardless of how powerful a person is and regardless of manifesting a One Pole in yesterday’s New World Order.


DISCUSSION AFTER SESSON ONE:

Question – comments

Conference participant: As a Christian I feel strongly that we should get out of Iraq. I wonder if you would be willing to consider the analogy of someone coming into a home, kicking down the door, smashing furniture, vandalising the house and saying I have just come in and now that I am in why should I go out, I will help in fixing the furniture and sorting out that house. We know that the weapons of mass destruction were a cock and bull story manufactured by the secret services. It seems to me the most appropriate analogy is of some who breaks into your home and then refuses to get out. If the argument is that someone has to do something let the Arab League, for example, or the Organisation of Islamic Conference come in and help the Iraqis to rebuild their country. I agree with what Lord Avebury said. The war has made Islamic people all around the world very angry with what they regard as Christian leader, like Bush and Blair. So as a Christian I feel very strongly that we should get out of Iraq and follow the example of the newly elected Spanish government which promised to get of Iraq.

Conference participant: Thank you to the speakers. I would like ask about the disarming of the militias. The Al Sadr militia are amateurs, they are not trained. But you have the Kurdish militias and no one is talking about them just because they are good with the Americans so far. And then you go for groups who are hardly trained properly and you call for dissolving them. The Kurdish militias could be the worse pressure group in elections.

Conference participant: It has been suggested that some of the Arab regimes do not want to see the project in Iraq to succeed. This worries me because I look at the Yemen. The Yemen is probably the most remarkable country democratically in the whole of the Arab world. It has survived, quite recently, a very nasty civil war between the north and the south. It has had free elections. There is even a small Baathist Party, along Iraqi lines, in Yemen today. I am asking therefore is there something else to it. The Yemenis have the consciousness of a national identity. It goes back 3000 years. There is this kind of feeling, I am a Yemeni. This applies to what was once south Yemen and north Yemen. Now it is one country. I think for Iraqis, apart from the graduates of Western institutions, the idea of ‘Iraq’ is a novel idea. It is really a British creation. This is why I am increasingly becoming so pessimistic about the future of a country called Iraq.
I used to talk with my friend, Abdul Majid Al Khoei and also the great Saeed Ayatollah Baqir Al Hakim about Iraq and they spoke of this great country which was going to live in peace and was going to do away with tribalism and ensure tolerance of religions. The Shias and Sunnis, the Christians and others would live in peace. I am beginning to feel that this really was dream talk and I think therefore one has cause for pessimism if you keep on talking about Iraq existing in harmony. Iraq may have to be divided in some way and if that happened a terrible civil war and chaos could ensure.

Conference participant: My question is for Ayatollah Al Hakim. I would like to ask why the Shias hate the Americans so much. The Shias got a very bad deal from Saddam and one of the first things they did when Saddam was overthrown was to protest against the Americans. Yet the Americans have allowed Shia rituals, including flagellation which is forbidden in Iran. They tried to involve all Shia parties in their dealings with the opposition.

Conference participant: I wanted to ask about the greater Middle East initiative. It has been suggested that the Americans ditched it or were ditching it. What role do you think Europe could play?

Lord Avebury: The international community has rejected the break up of Iraq and the neighbouring powers are against it, it isn’t really a starter. Whatever you may think about the history of Iraq – of course I agree with you. I have a 1911 edition of the encyclopaedia Britannica in which Iraq is described as two villayets of Basra and Baghdad. It was only when the British discovered it had oil in the vilayet of Mosul that they broke the armistice of 1918 and continued to advance northwards, occupying the oil fields. So they incorporated the vilayet of Mosul into their new fiefdom as they saw it. It was oil then and the issue is probably oil as much now. The international community has set itself very strongly against any kind of partition of Iraq. One consequence could be to promote a dispute about who would be in charge of the oil fields. When we had a previous discussion about the constitution it was made very clear, I think by Dr Mouffak Al Rubaie, that the control of mineral resources would be a federal responsibility and that if there were to be devolution and parts of Iraq had internal self government that would not be at the expense of maintaining the central control of the natural wealth of the country for the benefit of the whole people. That is what defeats the whole notion of the partition of Iraq. It is very dangerous and volatile process. There would definitely be a major confrontation between the different parts of Iraq.

Adel Darwish: The question of national identity will probably fuse into the question of the future of Iraq. It is actually the forces of Arab nationalism which have been the main hindrance to democracy, liberalisation and so on. Not Islam and not religion. If it was not for Arab nationalism eroding democracy and destroying national identity perhaps Islam would not have been a political alternative to people finding a new identity. There is actually nothing wrong with having some kind of federal Iraq where everyone is proud of ethnic roots and identity and also proud of being an Iraqi. As long as the federation is done along administrative, economic and human interests and distribution of resources rather than ethnic and religious divisions. If Paul Bremer had been reading the British rather than the American press, he may have analysed the situation differently and he would not have institutionalised a division that only existed in the American media. It did not actually exist on the ground. It is quite alarming the way in which the Turcomen, the Kurds and the Assyrians see perhaps article 7b of the constitution as eroding the national identity. It says that the people of Iraq are an integral part of the Arab nation. There is a legal entity called Iraq but there is no legal entity called the Arab nation. So the Turcomens and the Kurds are extremely worried about these things. The Turcomens may one day I belong to the Turkish nation and the Armenians may say I belong to the Armenian nation etc This would be a disaster.

Intervention: I am a Turcoman and I want to say that there is no one Turcoman who would say he belongs to Turkey.

Adel Darwish: I did not way that. I said that if you in Iraq say I belong to the Arab nation that in future may give the Turcomans the right to say we don’t belong to Iraq we belong to Turkey or the Armenians the right to say we don’t belong to Iraq we belong the Armenian nation.

Intervention: Our problem now is the problem of Kirkuk. The Kurds are saying it is a Kurdish city and the British and the Americans are supporting them.

Adel Darwish: You can still achieve peace. And that brings us to the question of militias. Once you actually integrate all of them. I did not say disbanding them – I sand integrating them into some kind of a federal, national army. In the British army you traditionally have different regiments from different parts of the country and they are very proud to belong to their regiment and to serve under the crown.

Ayatollah Al Hakim: When considering the various issues I agree with our colleagues when they were speaking about Iraq’s different minorities. It would be quite a complicated issue if we divide Iraq into different states and then we would have different countries there. There are those who speak about the Republic of Kurdistan and the Shia republic in the south. We accept the Kurds as a minority and they are Iraqis, we respect them. When we consider the Kurds I would like to draw attention to the Belgian situation where we find the Flems and the Belgians and they are all living peacefully and together and they carry out their duties towards their state. Therefore we do accept that everyone is free to use his own language and to be a committed citizen to his culture but at the same time we think it is very dangerous to divide Iraq into different countries. The Turkish authorities will speak about the Turkish minority. They have to get their rights. Then the Kurds who are living in Iran will speak about their own interests and separating from Iran. There are going to be endless cuts in the region and therefore we do accept freedom, liberty and everyone is free to practise his own religion and traditions and to be a Kurd, an Arab or a Turk but we are all Iraqis.
Regarding the second question from the audience I do not think I have ever said we hate Americans. This letter which I have translated for you was edited by an American lady. She is one of my students. Really I like Americans who feel for the miserable conditions the Iraqis have suffered from. At the same time they were willing to help Iraqis get rid of that dictator who was previously supported by America during the 80s when he was fighting Iran. The Iraqis were actually let down during the 1991 uprising. The British Prime Minister, Mr Blair, actually mentioned that. He said this time we will not let you down as we did in the early 90s. So in view of the past the Iraqis are very suspicious. They did not fight coalition forces, they did not fight in that severe and hard way of fighting they are capable of fighting and defending their country. We have two approaches. The first one is to say the Americans came to liberate this country. Fine. We would say now, actions speak louder than words. Our brother said the idea of resistance is very dangerous. I would agree with you. At the same time I would say it is as dangerous as the idea of an occupation.

Chairman: Can we return to the question about the legality of the occupation and the militias?

Lord Avebury: With reference to the militias – the militias have divided their governorate into two different regions and you have region which is controlled by the PUK and the other region which is controlled by the KDP. Until very recently anyway it was impossible for the KDP to campaign in the PUK area or for the PUK to campaign in the KDP area. But if you were going to have free elections I agree with you. I think that the presence of the militias in the Kurdish area is just as much a danger to free elections as it would be any where else in the country. I also agree with what has been said about the possibility of integrating these militias into the national army. You simply cannot have more than one kind of armed force within the boundaries of a state. The armed forces are required to act as a back up to the civilian authority in the maintenance of law and order. If you have more than one, which order are they going to maintain. So yes, lets get rid of all the militas, including the KDP and the PUK.

Chairman: The reverend’s question was if it was illegal to go to war is it not illegal to stay in Iraq?

Lord Avebury: Sorry, I answered the second question. I don’t think the analogy was quite right. If the thief comes into your house and your house is in order that is one matter. But if you have a house in which the father is tyrannising over the children and beating them up every day and bullying his wife then the person who comes into the house maybe simply trying to remove the tyrant and allow the wife and children to express themselves and lead a free life. I think that is what the coalition was intending to do. But I also agree they have a responsibility to get out and that getting out has to be within a fixed space of time. You can’t carry on forever with the occupation after the handover on June 30. It is up to the interim government on July 30 to say whether they want the coalition forces to remain. And I assume that until they got the national army and the national police force fully operational they won’t be abandon the help that the coalition forces give them because there will be no alternative. And if they sack them and they all go home then the country will disintegrate into chaos.

Adel Darwish: I just want to comment on the Arab League. They are not going to do it because the Arab League is just like a can of food that has outlived its sell by date and is still bubbling with what was happening 20 or 30 years ago. Unless they reform they should disband like the militia. The Arab League is still very much under the influence of this big romantic ideology of Arab nationalism and to gather and fight Israel. They could not even agree on what their own people need in terms of reform. They cannot convene and meet under the façade of some kind of unity. They postpone their meetings.
There is a rejection from the usual suspects as well as the Arab leaders of the American plan. There is an overkill of plans coming from Britain and Europe – a revival of practise in which the US has been involved in and put a lot of money into: the Mediterranean dialogue, the training of journalists. The British Council has been doing a great job on this front for many years. It is just a question of finding some kind of joint vehicles and use the experience and the resources of the West to actually work with the civil society and the people who want to change. They want to see it as a joint Arab League, Arab ummah plan confronting what they see as American intervention. And it is not going to go anywhere.

Conference participant: Four weeks ago there was a crime in Spain in 200 people were killed. It was described as a tragedy. But 240 people were killed in Falluja and they are still being killed. There should be an investigation to ask the government why civilians were killed. The same thing happens in Kufa. The secretary of Moquetdar Al Sadr was killed by Polish forces.
And a comment for the sheikh. You have given us a very interesting speech about Sayed Mohammed Baqir Al Sadr. It would be more interesting if you could say something about his son, his religious position. We would like information about his religious background.

Conference participant: Something has been said about the Arab League. The Arab League does not recognise the occupation so it cannot send forces. The league wants the US to hand over power to the Iraqis according to a timetable. Arab nationalism is a fact: we speak the same language from Algeria to Yemen, we have so many things in common.

Conference participant: I have just returned from Baghdad a week ago. I would like to describe the situation. The gentleman said if you allow someone to come to your home and destroy all your furniture and stay there. The question is if you are invited by the father who is bullying the family then yes, you are right. I don’t think that the Americans and the British have asked the Iraqi people seriously. The Iraqi people under the threat of Saddam did not have a voice, but there were so many voices outside. They opposed the war but nobody would listen to them. On the other hand the war was ended by the people themselves – they knocked Saddam down.. Some followers of Saddam’s regime reached a certain point and they pulled out for their next step. Saddam was a creation of the West. The people knew that. They will never forget what happened in Iraq. There are millions of people under the ground because of this. Now something similar may happen. The same style of what happened before and what his happening in Palestine. Sadr and what is happening in Falluja is happening to the people of Iraq. If the Americans keep on bombarding the people of Iraq just for the sake of raising their voices, all of Iraq will stand up. When they came everybody was optimistic that there would be a change. They were happy that Saddam had been removed. This dictator was removed after 35 years and now they have freedom to talk. Fine, they were happy. They did not have anything on their agenda. They came with monkey ideas of a handover. The Iraqis tired to accept this. The people on the Governing Council are from the people. They are there, but their arms are tied. Saddam did his massacre in 1991 but it was quiet. There was no BBC, Al Jazeera, no tv telling the people what is happening. Now the media is there. Now we seen our children being killed every day because four Americans were killed. This is not the answer. If your child did something wrong you do not shoot, you go and talk to them. You go and try to persuade him. Sadr is a young fellow. He has lots of followers.They know what happened to Majid Al Khoei. Where are the killers who did the massacre in Khadaminyah and Kerbala. Where were they? This is a very biased way of looking at things. It is not fair. I heard an American talking in the cities as if it was a joke. People are sick after one year. What is happening. I was living there for almost ten months in Iraq, trying to see everybody. They were so happy, now they are all against the West. Why? We are a peaceful people. We were so happy that someone got rid of this dictator. If you want to be a friend you have to give your hand, your sympathy, show them that you are a guest, not an occupier. You are the worse occupier. That is why we are criticising what is happening in Israel. This is exactly the same s what Sharon is going. That is why all the Muslims are now against him. Neither Iraqis nor Muslims will forget what is happening.

Conference participant: I was just wondering about the media. They only show the negative side of what is happening in Iraq. There are positive things happening and the media has a responsibility to show the positive side of what is happening. The Middle Eastern media and Al Jazeera is biased and they have an anti-American feeling. The two sides of what is happening in Iraq have to be shown.

Conference participant: What was the effect of events in Iraq on the rest of the Arab world and how do they react to these events. Two days ago Sharon threatened to assassinate Nasrallah. What would be the impact on the people of Iraq if that happened. A lot of the hatred to the Americans is because of their blinded support for Israel. But what will happen if Americans die in Iraq because of an Israeli action would that separate the interests of those two people.

Conference participant: When Saddam’s regime was in power the Iraqi people were asking the international community to come and rescue them from this brutal regime through the United Nations. But America and England they took their own initiative and came supposedly to rescue the Iraqi people. The people of the Arab world are afraid that America and Britain are talking about democracy but really they want to create another dictator. Where have America and Britain implemented a true democracy.

Conference participant: There is talk of democracy but the laws relating to privatisation will not be revoked.

Lord Avebury: There was a question about the civilians who were killed in Faluja and I think it is important that we should honour our own principles. Where civilians are being killed there should be proper enquiries and actions should be taken against the people who are responsible for departing from the laws of war, even to the extent that they may be charged with war crimes. The Americans have explicitly denounced the international criminal court and they are not part of it. It will not be possible to bring them before that institution. But we do investigate crimes against civilians. Where British troops have allegedly been involved in actions against civilians there has been a proper investigation. I hope that nobody can accuse of ignoring the allegations of this kind that have been made. I don’t want to pre judge the things that have happened under American control. All I will say is that it would be impossible to conduct an impartial inquiry in Faluja. Just imagine if you set up a court. How would you guarantee the security of the court and judges. How would you persuade witnesses to come forward and testify as to what they saw and how would they be protected. There are serious practical difficulties about conducting an impartial, independent inquiry under the circumstances.
Regarding what the lady said about the Arab media showing the negative side, this is a fact. If anybody looks at Al Jazeera – and I am one of the greatest admirers of Al Jazeera because I think it is a breath of fresh air in the Arab world and it manages to convey news and debate in the Arab world which is not reached by an independent media – I don’t want censorship of this media. I would like them to display more of a sense of responsibility and I would like them to realise that everything they say has an immediate effect on the street in Faluja, or Najaf or whenever it may be. Peoples emotions can take them in a direction which would be harmful to a final settlement.


Session 2
Chairman:
As we are waiting for Michael Binyon to arrive I have been given the chance to give you a little talk about what is happening in Iraq, being an Iraqi who fled from Saddam’s oppression and sentenced to death in absentia. I have been working in this country for 20 years as a consultant physician in various teaching hospitals and at the moment I am trying to help our battered Iraqi nation to find its feet and its way in this very complex situation.
My understanding of the situation is that there is a loss of mind and a loss of vision all around, including among the people responsible for pushing the situation towards a better future in Iraq. Amongst the allied forces who claimed they were going to Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction and liberating the Iraqis from their oppression of this dictator. A year on we are still waiting to see some evidence of these claims. The Iraqi people loved to see change and they clapped their hands at the change of regime despite all the sacrifices which could have been avoided, in my mind.
I have been writing articles under various names and for various organisations which have been following events very closely. Various Iraqi groups held meetings with those who are responsible for making policy at the Foreign Office here, and in America, but unfortunately events took a rapid turn towards and all out war between the superpowers and a Third World country.
What we are seeing now is a situation getting out of hand which I think is mainly due to lack of direction, lack of respect for the rule of law and a single minded belief in modern welfare and military technology and also banking on the good will of the Iraqi people to be patient and stand together hoping to see the light at the end of the tunnel.
I think the situation at the moment has deteriorated into a popular uprising unnecessarily – it could have been avoided by mutual consensus, by senior politicians being aware of the situation in Iraq. People have been deprived of expression of opinion, or publishing a newspaper, of using a simple typewriter to write anything. Suddenly they saw freedom, they were able to march in the streets, they were able to publish newspapers.
So to close a newspaper with a circulation of 10,000 copies and trigger off such a uncontrollable reaction needs to be discussed and analysed. People need to be brought to book because innocent civilians are facing a terrible death.
The previous regime is history. We are all human beings, our message is to live together on this planet and to work together and learn how to live together rather than polarising the planet and pushing it to destruction.
I am very pleased to have Justin beside me. We have worked together on the debts of Iraq and I will pass the platform to him to enlighten us about his assessment of the situation.


Saddam’s odious debt:
Justin Alexander, Jubilee Iraq
Thank you for the invitation to speak today. Our minds are of course on the current carnage in Iraq, but while we cry and pray and hope for an end to the killings on both sides, that should not prevent us considering less visible threats to Iraq’s future. I’m going to talk briefly about one of the most serious threats which could hamstring the economy and limit Iraqi freedom irrespective of the composition of the future government. But it is a threat which Iraqis can tackle now if they present a firm and united position to the outside world.
The threat I’m talking about is Saddam’s foreign debt and war reparations. I’m going to quickly outline the background, discuss the position of the US and then explain the problems with their approach from the perspective of Iraqis.

Background

When Saddam took control of the Presidency in 1979, Iraq had savings of $36bn. Within a decade this had been transformed into a debt of over $70bn. Today, after thirteen years of sanctions during which interest accumulated, and war reparations were awarded, Saddam’s total unpaid bills stand at something like $164bn, although no one knows the precise figure and it could be even higher.
When you or I run up debts we usually have corresponding assets. A house to balance against our mortgage, a degree to set against our student loan. Iraq however has nothing to balance against the world’s worst debt burden, since the loans and credit financed Saddam’s regime through the Iran-Iraq war, the Al-Anfal genocide and right up until the invasion of Kuwait. In fact just nine months before the invasion of Kuwait, US Secretary of State James Baker was in Baghdad promising Tariq Aziz an extra $1bn of American credit.
My friend Ahmed Jiyad, now a UN economist in Uganda but previously one of Iraq’s debt negotiators, warned in 1988 that Iraq was going to face an insurmountable financial crisis in 1991 because of debt maturities requiring the repayment of over $20bn that year. This rarely mentioned fact sheds light on Saddam’s demand in July 1990 that the Gulf countries drop their claims and help Iraq pay off debts to non-Arab countries.
Negotiations to this effect in Jeddah failed, and a few days later Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait. Other factors, such as the low oil price, were at play, but the debt was central to the financial crisis which motivated Saddam’s second foreign war. In short, the suffering of the Iraqi people over the last twenty five years - during which over 2 million have been killed, the infrastructure has been devastated and human development indicators have deteriorated below those of Bangladesh – this suffering is intimately related to the very debt which threatens Iraq today.

What’s happening?

So what is being done in the face of this debt crisis? For most of 2003 the answer was very little indeed. Whenever we pressed Coalition officials they were unaware of the issue or felt that it could be ignored for the time being. Finally in December Bush appointed James Baker to fly around the world – going almost everywhere except Iraq – talking about debt. Bad reporting suggested that Baker had achieved a dramatic breakthrough to the benefit of Iraq, but the truth is rather different.
Baker merely secured the agreement of countries to negotiate the debt in a forum called the Paris Club, which is a self-interest cartel of the wealthiest creditors. Even on it’s own terms the Paris Club has a dismal record of failure, and from the perspective of poor indebted countries it has served only to keep them poor, indebted and under the thumb.
Baker and the Paris Club members have stated very clearly that they expect Iraq to sign a legally binding debt agreement this year. So that’s after the transition of sovereignty but before the Iraqi people have had the chance to vote. We can predict what this agreement will look like.
Firstly it will reduce the paper value of the debt by a certain amount. How much is unclear. France and Germany have said 50%, Russia has mentioned 65% and the World Bank 66%. It would be very surprising if it were higher than this.
If the best case scenario of a two-thirds debt reduction happens, it will only directly apply to the $42bn claimed by Paris Club members. Iraq would have to negotiate similar terms with the other creditors, some of which, such as Bulgaria and Hyundai, have forcefully stated that they would not accept a large reduction. Even if every creditor agreed to this two thirds cut, the remaining debt would be massive.
Assuming that Iraq’s economy recovers strongly, in 2007 the debt and reparations would still be twice GDP and over 4 times oil revenues. That places Iraq way ahead of other countries in the region, and it is even worse than Argentina which is currently in the middle of a severe debt crisis. In terms of debt service, even on a low 5% interest rate and a 20 year rescheduling, Iraq will be required to pay around $4bn a year in addition to reparations. This compares to Iraq’s combined health and education budgets which are just $1.5bn this year (and I should note in passing that Iraq has paid a similar amount - $1.5bn - in reparations over the last year).
The second aspect of the Paris Club agreement is that it will ignore the origins of the debt and the culpability of the creditors. As the Economist Magazine has recently said, the deal will be “on the basis of what [the Paris Club] judge to be Iraq’s ability to pay - not on the rightness of its having to do so.” But Iraqis are well aware of the illegitimacy of most of the debt and the damaging effect it has had on their recent history. In October I visited Iraq and consulted with 30 different parties and organisations. I found a real unity in their views. The full report is on our website, but let me give you a few representative quotes:
• Waleed Al-Hilli of the Al Da’wa Party told me “The Iraqi people had no say in the debts. All the creditors knew that Saddam was an oppressive dictator – everyone knew that, everyone.”
• Perweez Mohammed of the PUK said “Saddam never spent money for the benefit of the Iraqi people, but just for himself and his followers, and the creditors cooperation enabled Saddam to preside over atrocities such as Halabja.”
• Hajim Al Hassani of the Iraqi Islamic Party concluded “Iraq is not responsible for any debts which supported the regime’s war machine. Rather it is the creditors who should be paying compensation to Iraq.”
As it happens there is a principle in international law which formalizes the views Iraqis expressed to me. The Doctrine of Odious Debt states that when a regime contracts debts without the consent of the people and spends them in a way which is not beneficial and when the creditors are well aware of the situation, then they are personal debts of the regime and do not pass on to the state once it is free. This legal principle was formulated in the 1920s by Alexander Sack, a Russian legal expert working in exile in Paris. He disputed Soviet Russia’s repudiation of the debts of the Tsarist regime, and argued that in general debts must remain when governments change. However, he argued that there are exceptions when the conditions of odiousness were clearly met. The doctrine was applied a number of times in the last century, including in Cuba, Poland and Costa Rica. However, in the last fifty years when the Paris Club and the IMF have ruled the roost, many countries such as post-Apartheid South Africa have been bullied into paying odious debts.
This brings us onto the third and possibly most dangerous aspect of a Paris Club agreement. In return for debt relief the Paris Club requires countries to follow economic policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund. The idea is that high levels of debt result from economic mistakes, and therefore debt relief should be dependent on correcting those mistakes.
This sounds fair in principle, however in practice IMF policies are often incredibly damaging, as has been the case in Argentina and across Africa. The Paris Club has made it clear that it wants the transitional government to sign up to an IMF program this Autumn as part of a deal on debt. The the debt relief “would be stretched out over three years with each years’ reduction linked to meeting performance targets under an IMF program.”
IMF economic conditions are likely to include the standard package of rapid privatisation, trade liberalisation and fiscal austerity which could be very damaging to Iraq, as they have been for post-Soviet Russia and many other countries. Dr Saleh Yasir of the Iraqi Communist Party warned me that “IMF conditions neglect the social consequences of economic policies. An IMF program would create more social tension which might destroy the transition to democracy.”
The IMF’s view of macroeconomics focuses on foreign investors and international markets and will take little consideration of Iraq’s huge social needs such as 50% unemployment. Furthermore, IMF conditions – whether good or bad - will restrict Iraqi independence, meaning key economic decisions will continue to be made in Washington not Iraq. Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr Al-Uloum personally favours IMF-style policies but told me proudly: "We are Iraq! We were the cradle of civilization and should be the richest country in the Middle East, so I don’t want to see anyone controlling our economy by any means."







So what is the alternative?

Jubilee Iraq argues that the fairest way forward, both for Iraq and for legitimate creditors, is an arbitration tribunal. Imagine what it would be like if, as an indebted individual, a group of banks and credit card companies divided up your belongings and threw you in a debtor prison. Thankfully that doesn’t happen to individuals anymore because the law protects them from creditors, and even companies and local government are protected under insolvency laws. However, countries are still at the mercy of creditors, particularly the Paris Club.
An arbitration tribunal would redress the imbalance. Rather than creditors playing judge, jury and executioner, both Iraq and Saddam’s creditors would be able to argue their cases to a jointly agreed and independent panel of judges. A first stage in the process would be deciding which debts are legitimate, and even CPA economic advisor Marek Belka has admitted that “90% of Saddam’s debt is war related”. Repayment terms for the remaining non-odious debt - for example relating to productive infrastructure projects dating from the before Saddam came to power - could be repaid on terms which would not hamper Iraq’s economic recovery or diminish its freedom.
So why is the US not promoting this approach? A cynic might suspect that Washington is embarrassed about how Reagan and Bush senior backed Saddam until 1990. Perhaps the White House would rather not remind anyone of Baker’s $1 billion pledge to Tariq Aziz. The British government may also want to avoid discussion of Falluja 2, a chlorine plant which the CIA identified as a key component in Iraq's chemical weapons program and which Colin Powell mentioned in his speech to the UN in February last year. This factory was built secretly by a British company in 1985 underwritten by the Export Credit Guarantee Department and hence is part of Saddam’s debt to Britain.
A cynic might further surmise that an Iraq with a reduced, but nonetheless significant, burden of debt will remain dependent on foreign aid, presumably much of it from Washington. With his eye on US basing rights and control of oil fields, Bush may prefer a weak, indebted Iraq that it can control to a debt-free Iraq which could stand on its own two feet. To prove the cynics wrong, Bush and Baker will have to deliver much more than a poor Paris Club deal that reinforces the status quo.
If creditors refuse to place their claims under the light of an arbitration tribunal, then Iraq will be justified in repudiating those debts. Creditors might try to bully Iraq by claiming that repudiating odious debt would threaten future credit ratings. Yet the opposite is true, since a debt-free Iraq would be much more able to repay future loans, as a recent report by Fitch Ratings demonstrates. Even the editors of the Wall Street Journal concur. Not otherwise known for their forgiving attitude toward debtors, they wrote last year that: "We wouldn't blame Iraq’s leaders if they decided that some of those financial obligations are indeed odious. And given that this is such an extreme case, international lenders probably wouldn't hold it against them for long.”
To this end Jubilee Iraq is working for the elimination of the debt and the war reparations – since it is clearly unjust for Saddam’s victims in Iraq to pay reparations for his crimes outside Iraq. We are building international support and developing arguments to encourage and empower Iraq’s leaders to take a strong stand and not cave into the Paris Club, as so many countries have done in the past to their long term detriment.
I have faith in the resilience and courage of the Iraqi people to achieve peace, democracy and prosperity. But they have enough problems to tackle as it is, and should not have to pay Saddam’s bills as well.



Britain and Iraq - is there any way out?
Michael Binyon, leader writer at The Times newspaper

I am sorry to arrive late. Condolezza Rice was testifying and I had to listen to what she had to say about Iraq which was not very much. It was mostly about Al Qaeda.
I am going to question the title I have been given: Is there any way out? That supposes that Britain wants a way out. That is not altogether clear at the moment. And secondly is there any way out right now? The short answer is ‘no’ but I think I better elaborate.
Tony Blair indeed will be asking that question when he meets President Bush within the next few days in Washington and Iraq will obviously dominate their meeting. It is a routine meeting, it is looking at the range of joint policies in the fight against terror. In particular, I think Iraq will be very much on Mr Bush’s mind and I think very much on Mr Blair’s mind because what is happening could cause them political ill health back at home.
Iraq has been a very difficult and growing wound in Mr Blair’s body politik that refuses to heal. It was kept open and raw all last year by the controversy of who said what to whom on the BBC and by the real controversy that no weapons of mass destruction were found and by the fact that the Labour Party generally felt it had been deceived by the Prime Minister’s assurance that Saddam posed an existential threat to the rest of the world. The feeling in the Labour Party is that he did not. He many have well posed a threat to his own people and they are well rid of him but the reason for going to war was not the one given to the British people and the British people do not forgive what they see as deception by their leaders.
That is the feeling among a large number of people in the Labour Party and for this reason the continuing presence of British troops is controversial It is not controversial in the same way as it is in America. In other words, Britain is not worried about the conduct of its troops in Iraq. British people on the whole tend to think that the troops in Iraq are doing a reasonable job and that to some extent they are reasonably welcome. I would not go further than to say ‘reasonably’, and at the moment there is not a great ground swell of opinion that British troops should be brought home because they are either oppressors, acting badly or unwelcome.
The reason their presence is controversial is because a lot of people think they should not be there in the first place, whether or not they are doing a reasonable job at the moment. And this goes to the heart of why we went to war and what the reasons for invading Iraq were and whether or not Britain has the same agenda as America and whether or not we are tied to America’s agenda.
I think that will be very important when Mr Blair talks to Mr Bush. He wants to know really from the President – what is your agenda. I think it is pretty clear what Britain’s agenda would be and it is also pretty clear that at the moment, whatever the circumstances and fighting in Iraq, the Americans are going to stick to their proclaimed goals, which is a hand over of power at the end of June.
Regardless of the calls from various senators to change that date I do not think that anything is going to persuade Mr Blair and Mr Bush to either postpone the handover date or to get out before that date.
Handing over in a state of chaos or a state of considerable civil strife, as we are seeing at the moment, is very problematic but I don’t think there would be any gain in postponing the handover date. In fact there would be a huge loss because as far as American public opinion is concerned and to a certain extent Arab public opinion a postponement would look like continued occupation and continued responsibility for what is happening in Iraq.
Handing over responsibility to a new government is not very much of a handover because most of the decision-making will remain in American hands, certainly decisions about security, decisions about economic infrastructure and many things will remain in the hands of that extremely large American embassy that is going to be set up in place of the coalition government. But nominally it will be an Iraqi government. That is very important symbolically and certainly it is very important to Tony Blair. Whether Britain thinks there is a possibility of withdrawing troops after that depends very much on the security situation. And it also depends in Britain’s view on getting in other members of the United Nations to internationalise Iraq and the occupation of Iraq.
It may no longer be called an occupation but a stabilisation force. But Tony Blair has always believed that the Anglo-American invasion should only be the first step in the internationalisation of the problem. The Americans have evidently been less keen on bringing in the United Nations. There is a certain feeling of annoyance at the United Nations after the fiasco of last year and the failed second vote in the Un.
But the fact is that he sees no alternative except by giving this some kind of international UN legitimacy which it plainly lacks at the moment. Whatever the Attorney General’s view and whatever Mr Blair’s own speeches on the legitimacy of the occupation of Iraq, he would clearly feel more comfortable is this had the blessing of the Security Council in some form or other.
Certainly if there is an agreement among the permanent five members and the Security Council as a whole that there should be a much bigger role for the UN politically and a bigger role for Ibrahimi, the very astute and skilled Algerian diplomat who has worked wonders in other places at other times – if he can be persuaded to take a larger role in Iraq, that is what Mr Blair would like. And that is the first step in the internationalisation of the Iraqi imbroglio.
At the moment it is internationalised by the fact that there are troops from a surprising number of countries already there. People have lost sight of the fact that it is not just America, Britain, Spain, Italy and Poland. In fact you can list dozens of countries – there are Baltic contingents there. Albanians – I am not sure how skilled they are – they may be troops in name but they are gangsters in practise. Yet they are eager to play a larger role as part of their international credentials.
In fact there are troops already from a very large number of countries in Iraq but they lack international legitimacy. They joined the coalition of the willing or they were persuaded to join it. Tony Blair believes that pull out is too early a measure to think about now. What we ought to think about now is getting in peace-keeping troops or stabilisation troops who have some kind of international acceptance which in turn would give them greater acceptance, he believes, in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis.
Mr Blair also thinks that a political settlement is almost unattainable without looking at the root causes of political instability in the region. He is persuaded that the wave of terrorism and the wave of killings and shootings that we have seen until about several weeks was instigated largely from outside. British intelligence is pretty clear about this. Intelligence believes they have quite a good grip on where this terrorism is coming from, who some of the individuals are, what kind of backing and money they are getting and where it is coming from. How to stop it is a different matter.
The important thing is to separate ordinary Iraqis from those who are coming in stirring up anger and hatred, bombing various targets, setting back the infrastructure recovery and doing it in the name of liberation.
The problem is the greater the frustration of ordinary Iraqis, the more these people will have credibility in Iraqi eyes as being people who are trying to get the foreign occupiers out. And British foreign policy, more than anything else has set out the distinction between those people targeting coalition troops in the name of liberation and ordinary Iraqis in whose name this was being done.
There was a feeling that with the terrible bombings a month ago when more than 200 Shia were the victims many Iraqis did finally see that what was being done in their name of liberation was not liberation at all – it was terrorism.
The trouble is that the current uprising has muddled that perception and the heavy-handed response to it has muddled that perception and made it inevitable that there is a no win situation for the Americans, and to a lesser extent, there is a no win situation for the British.
I say to a lesser degree because the British have had more success in the south. I think it is a mistake to say that the British know it all and they are such marvellous troops they never have problems, because they have had problems. But they have a pretty clever knack of simply withdrawing and saying ‘take it easy’ when things get too hot. That is what they have tended to do. This has meant that certain very critical situations in the south, and standoffs, have melted away just at the really dangerous levels.
Whereas the Americans who have no experience of peace-keeping in Bosnia or Northern Ireland and other places don’t know at which point to back off and withdraw. And hence you get confrontations that become matters of face, of policy, of pride and in the end of blood and people get killed. The British have had a bit more experience and a bit more luck but that does not mean that they are not going to be seen as occupiers by very many people if this uprising is not either contained, or defused or negotiated away.
I don’t think the British believe that Sadr is anything but an opportunist, jockeying for power, making his move now because he knows it is a no win situation for the Americans and he also knows that if there is a clash it is extremely unlikely that other Shia groups, even though they would like to see him smacked on the head and pushed down, are actually going to join in any military operations against his people.
It is also perfectly clear that he has rallied a very large number of disaffected Iraqis, those who have nothing lose, those who are frustrated not so much because of the political situation, they are simply frustrated because they have no job. Those people who live in slums and where the accumulation of years of injustice has burst out in an explosion of frustration.
Sadr has very cleverly united all that behind his own uprising which I think is a purely opportunistic uprising. But it makes it one that is really a threat to the present time-table nonetheless.
I think Tony Blair will have no doubt that to give in to such an optimistic event would be sign of weakness. There will be no pulling out in the face of the present clashes but equally he may make it clear to Mr Bush that you have to have to handle this extremely carefully or tactfully, otherwise the whole thing is turned upside down and then you have the entire country united in a wish to get rid of the occupiers.
I don’t think Ayatollah Sistani has any wish to push that towards a confrontation because all he has to do is wait. All he has to do is wait three months and power is in his hands. The Americans know that, the British certainly know it and he knows it. That is why this move is being made now. Those that are ambitious would like to stir the cup in advance so they can have the power already there.
The pacification of Iraq, or at least bringing some kind of stabilisation to the country demands considerable experience and British troops have a certain amount, but probably not enough. They have the experience of northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo and various other places where there is a realisation that peace-keeping is a combination not only of fairness and tough policing of the streets but a certain relaxed understanding that local leaders and customs must in the end are the ones that are respected and hold the day.
It is not up to the British in Basrah to dictate to the people who to run the city. It is up to them to hold the ring, to produce the framework, in which respected local leaders can run the city. Principally that means bringing security to the streets because that is the one thing stopping local being able to exercise local authority. And that is why I think Tony Blair has no intention of pulling troops out at a time when there is clearly not enough stability or security to make it possible for Iraqis to exercise proper control.
Equally it means training some kind of police force that has respect and authority on the streets which at the moment it doesn’t. The police force on the streets has shown itself to be pretty weak in the present situation. It has not got enough experience, it is not properly trained, it is doing better than it did, it is able to catch ordinary bandits better than it was, it is able to control traffic which are fairly rudimentary tasks. But there will have to be a lot more international effort put into the infrastructure and support for the police, courts and things of that kind.
The pressure to pull out is there but the question is is there much pressure to pull out from within this country. And that is where the interesting political calculation comes in. Iraq may have been an extremely unpopular operation, more unpopular now than before the war and certainly more unpopular now than during the war. But there isn’t at the moment very much pressure for Britain to pull out. It is not a sort of Spain or Italy situation.
First of all British troops have been in places where they are not very much wanted several times before so there is a sort of tolerance and understanding that if you do a job like that you are going to be unpopular and people are not going to thank you for it. Therefore the idea that Britain is universally hated is one that is tremendously upsetting for ordinary public opinion. People are quite used to that, they are used to being called imperialists, colonialists or whatever.
So I don’t think the pressure is coming from the idea that this operation is making Britain extremely unpopular. Many people say that is bad and we are going the wrong way. Many people disagreed with the operation from the start but there isn’t the pressure saying pull everyone out. I think that even those who disagreed with the way the war was fought think that a premature withdrawal of troops will lead to nothing but a fight in Iraq and a possible civil war.
There is an enormous wish to give it United Nations legitimacy and to internationalise the idea and possibly ask other Arab countries whether they would like to join peace-keeping forces - and other Muslim countries as well. I don’t think there is very much prospect of that at the moment and it would be a problem to try to persuade other countries to do that.
The next question is can Britain be frightened into leaving. Would it be another Spain if Al Qaeda targeted the London underground or some other target. That is very difficult to tell. The normal answer is of course it would not happen here, we are made of tougher stuff than the Spanish. At least that is what people say but it doesn’t seem to be true. A recent poll showed that 43% feel a terrorist action would increase the pressure to remove troops from Iraq. Not only is there an expectation that there may be attack on Britain – there is almost official certainty that there will. The Chief of the Metropolitan Police is saying that is almost inevitable that there will be some kind of mass atrocity within this country.
If there is how will the public react? Certainly there will be much greater pressure for the Prime Minister to do something to lessen the threat to Britain and to do something taking into account sensibilities in the Arab world. The problem is that is very difficult to know what more should be done, apart from simply pulling troops out.
Mr Blair is obsessed – I would say rightly concerned that political problems must be addressed as well as military problems. He is also very concerned by what he sees as the disaffection of Muslim opinion in Britain. The arrest of indigenous British Muslims on charges of conspiring to commit terrorism has been a real worry. It has shown that disaffection is a lot more than simply trouble in Elden or worries about jobs. It is a disaffection among a very large number of young Muslims who oppose the war in Iraq and seem attracted by the idea of a fairly extremist political agenda. They are attracted by Al Muhajoroon and others.
It is very well for organisations that the Prime Minister likes, like the Muslim Council of Britain which represents the overwhelmingly moderate face of Islamic Britain. It takes an enormous effort to integrate those who, at the moment, do not feel integrated. It takes a very great effort on the part of the majority community, white Britons, to extend equal opportunities so that they are seen as equal. And it takes a very great effort to change perceptions.
In many cases the perceptions are wrong. There are many people who will cite all kinds of instances of discrimination of Islamophobia but the plain fact of the matter is they did not get a job because they were not well enough qualified. This does not stop people thinking that there is a conspiracy to keep Muslims out of jobs. There may indeed be cases of that. I am sure there are many instances of that. But the problem is that when one community feels alienated than everything that goes wrong is seen as part of the conspiracy and alienation.
That is what is happening to many young Muslims and sadly not just those who have not got a job but people who have very good jobs working in IT and in jobs that pay certain wages. There is that feeling of , if not spiritual alienation, certainly some kind of alienation from the main stream. And that is a worry and puts pressure on Mr Blair to change that alienation. One of the things that is absolutely clear is that many people feel he should change the policy in Iraq.
Certainly one of the things he is willing to do is to make more efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Right from the start, Tony Blair believed that Bush got it wrong over the Palestinians, that he was so one-sided in his approach to the Middle East situation it was seen that America no longer had any qualifications to be an honest broker there. Certainly that is how it seemed to most Palestinians and to most Muslim people and that is, to some extent, how it seems to the British government as well. But he can’t actually say that aloud. What Blair will say quietly and in private will be “look George”, as he probably starts his conversations “we really have got to do something in this region – it is a running sore and a festering wound and a symbolic wound for people living thousands of miles away from the Palestinian question. One can’t honestly say that Israeli oppression in Gaza is actually hurting people in Bangladesh or Kuwait or all over the place – it isn’t. It is hurting people in Gaza. But the fact is that the feelings of solidarity and the feelings of fellow Muslim support for those who seem to be the victims of injustice is such that many people in Bangladesh believe they are hurt by what is going on in Palestine. And therefore it is an issue that must be resolved in order to produce greater stability throughout the Muslim. And I think that is something Mr Blair understands fairly well.
Again the problem is that his room for manoeuvre is very limited. There isn’t much he can do. He can urge George Bush to get involved but he has to recognise that as far as domestic politics are concerned this is not the time or place to suggest a new initiative in the Middle East, four months from an election when George Bush large financial donors all have interests on the other side of the equation. That is not something that is realistic to ask the Americans to do. It is realistic to urge them to take some kind of eye catching initiative to quell the present cycle of violence or to put some kind of pressure on Sharon – how much he will is an open question.
The pressure on Tony Blair to get the troops out is there – it is there in the Labour Party, it is there in the Muslim community, it is there in the sense that I think Blair himself does not really believe that this is a good long term solution.
But there won’t be any quick change. I do not think that anybody in government sees a sudden pullout as realistic or viable or indeed desirable. I don’t think any attack on Britain would change the Prime Minister’s policy. I certainly do not think it would change the British policy.
What the polls show is an open question – it is an unknown – one hopes that it will never have to be proved one way or the other. I don’t think if we have an atrocity blowing up several hundred people somewhere either the government would fall or change its policy straight away.
The only way out is unfortunately the boring way out which is slow, patient, long-term, negotiated, under the cover of the United Nations, with the agreement of the Iraqis a slow drawing down of presence just as we are seeing a slow exit from Bosnia and Kosovo. It is taking a long time to get out of Bosnia. Mr Blair and the Defense Department would like to be out of there much quicker. It would save a lot of money. But once you are in it is difficult to get out fast and I think Britain is going to find the same thing in Iraq.



DISCUSSION AFTER SESSION

Chairman: Thank you very much for this panoramic view of what is happening in the region. Perhaps we can open the floor for discussion. I hope Mr Blair has consulted the wise men in the Labour Party, the other parties and some people like yourself, before he flies across to see George Bush so that at least he has shown that he really wants to listen and find a way out. I think that lots of wise people have some ideas which might help to develop the official policy of Tony Blair towards getting the Iraqis and the people of the region out of this difficult situation.

Conference participant: I was interested in what you were saying about the debt problem. It has been going on for twenty or thirty years. What is there to practically stop Iraq from saying okay, sorry, we can’t pay anything back for the next twenty years. How could they be forced to pay.

Justin Alexander: Short of the American soldiers in Iraq holding a gun to the Minister of Finance and saying sign the cheque there is no way in which Iraq could be forced to pay. It is customary that countries do pay debt. Iraq should, as you suggest, take a very firm line on debt. It has a very strong moral argument and it has a lot of international support. It should at least demand arbitration and if its creditors refuse to agree to this Iraq can refuse to pay.

Conference participant: You made a very skilled argument that Al Sadr is an opportunist. I am sure you could make an equally skilled argument that he is reacting to the closure of his paper and the killing of his assistant.

Michael Binyon: That is true but a skilled political operator looks for opportunities to add to his cause. And that was a heaven sent opportunity – an American sent opportunity should I say. Closing down the paper seemed to me unwise. He was looking for fight. It would have been much easier not to offer any pretext to get into a confrontation with him. It is also perfectly true that it was the suspicion that it was his followers how murdered Al Khoei before has been a suspicion that has been around for some time. Why it should come out right now seems to be foolish. I think the Americans, or whoever else, had very good reasons for believing that he is if not personally, certainly morally responsible for this murder. But it would have been much more sensible to have left those things for at least another three months in order to avoid a confrontation now – and it was quite clear he was looking for a confrontation.

Conference participant The very existence of the confrontation in Iraq has refuted the argument that this war has made the world safer from terrorism. Quite the opposite. Can Mr Binyon tell as more about these dark forces which are responsible for these acts of terror in Iraq.

Conference participant My deep sources in security and intelligence are not so easily revealed. I have had one of two discussions with people who are in some position to know that there are people with clear links to Al Qaeda coming in from outside. There isn’t an obvious pattern to this. They are individuals, they are groups of people and there is a certain pattern of finance coming through various channels supporting these people. The point that you make is a very good one. The Iraq operation has not made the world safer for terrorism. What is has done it has given again a marvellous opportunity for those who were looking to have a confrontation with the West in general and America in particular to use Iraq as a standard under which they can rally all those who are disaffected and those who believe America represents evil in the world and a threat to civilisation. They will all then have a common call to come to Iraq and fight the enemy. And quite a few have responded to that call. Iraq has become a sort of magnet sucking in people who thought they would like to join some kind of fight against the West and America in particular. And here is the battlefield. There it is and that is why they are coming in. A number of the operations that have taken place in Iraq have been planned by people who have come in from outside, who were hoping to do something in any case. It may mean coincidently that there are fewer operations going on in Afghanistan against the Americans or in other parts. It is much easier and much more in the public eye to go and have a crack at them in Iraq. And that is exactly what has happened.

Conference participant: I would like to raise the human rights issue. Blair has been suggesting the human rights issue as an excuse for intervention in Iraq, like in the Sedgfield speech. But in dealing with Libya the human rights issue was not raised. Is this not another reason for the growing disenchantment with foreign policy?

Michael Binyon: You are asking Tony Blair to behave like a Frenchman with impeccable universal logic which is impossible. He doesn’t have it. It is perfectly true. You have pointed out several contradictions. And one of the things that has made it very difficult for Blair politically is that he keeps changing the basis, the reason, for the intervention in Iraq. It would probably actually have been better if he said right from the start there is no legal justification for going into Iraq but Saddam is a very bad man who is oppressing his people and we wish to help the people get rid of him which is actually what the line is now. We got rid of him – isn’t that a good thing. But it was thought that that somehow was a little bit too presumptuous even at a time when a similar argument was used in Kosovo, or in Bosnia. That the reason for intervention was purely a humanitarian one. There was no suggestion that Milsovic was posing an existential threat to the wider world or that he harboured dangerous weapons. It was purely on a human rights basis that Britain intervened in Kosovo. In Kosovo it almost seemed alright for public opinion in Britain to accept that – that there was a group that was being so oppressed and so badly treated that the outside world had a duty to intervene. And that is a doctrine that is becoming more acceptable within the United Nations itself. The old Cold War doctrine that you can do anything as long as you do not touch what goes on inside another country, the frontiers give each country complete autonomy to act as it wants, that doctrine has rather begun to crumble in recent years and it was given the final death blow by Rwanda. The feeling that you do have to intervene in certain humanitarian situations. If Blair had used that as the only argument it would have been perhaps more persuasive. But the problem was that that argument looked awfully like the bottom line Bush argument which simply did not work in Britain at all. Everybody knows the bottom line Bush argument : we don’t like the son of a bitch so we are going to get rid of him. And because my dad did not like him I am going to finish the job. That is not an argument that can be deployed. And hence we got this whole legalistic argument about weapons of mass destruction. By changing the argument several times you weaken it each time because then none of the arguments look very credible.
On the wider issue of human rights I think it is very difficult because Uzbekistan is a real problem and this is pure opportunism to rather overlook what is a very poor record by the ex-Soviet, now nationalist strongman.
On Libya I actually would defend the prime minister strongly. Clearly Qathafi has done some dreadful things in the past, clearly he is a wacky individual but after all if you do persuade somebody to change course and to give up weapons you certainly ought to reward him – otherwise what is the point of doing it. You ought to reward and welcome him by saying now we will give you all the goodies that you really wanted – not simply money. What he wants is acceptance, acceptability, friendship and a welcome. I think that is legitimate even if you simply think of it in terms of forgiveness.

Conference participant: It seems that democracy in the Middle East is against American interests. It has always relied on a strong man. On another point it is confusing for me when I hear that resisting occupation is terrorism. If my country is occupied I have to resist. The Libyan people do not have any rights – we have to contain Qathafi and give them their rights.

Michael Binyon: Certainly there are several issues there. You have brought up several points all of which are very important. First of all on the question of democracy I think the argument of the neo-conservatives that we should bring democracy to the Middle East is an argument back to front. It is an argument to justify a course of action that they decided for different reasons. The course of action they decided was that they wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Then to justify this they invented this argument about the need to bring greater democracy to the Middle East. There is nothing wrong with the idea of greater democracy in the Middle East. It is a very powerful idea in the Middle East itself. And if you ask anyone in the region, everybody will say that one of the problems of this region is that governments here are unresponsive to public opinion and are not properly democratic. Even those which are so-called friendly governments – friendly to the West - they are not very friendly to their own people. And there is considerable frustration and dissatisfaction on that score. But equally people will say it is up to us to decide how to solve this problem. It is not up to America to dictate first of all what sort of democracy we should have or secondly to bring democracy to this country. To some extent people would welcome American pressure that might make the internal regimes of some of these countries more democratic and the obvious place where they good start could be Egypt where America does have a considerable amount of political and economic influence and where there is plenty of scope for greater democracy within Egypt itself. That is where if America was sent to be siding with those pressing for greater democratic rights and human rights that would bring it some kind of good will. The problem is that this is linked in perception, thought perhaps not in fact, to a completely different issue, the Palestinian-Israeli question. There isn’t a political, and certainly no causal link, between Iraq and the Palestinian question. They re different parts of the country, different parts of the Middle East and they are different things. But the perception is that it is the same player who holds the cards in both cases, namely the Americans. And if the Americans lack credibility to one area, they equally and automatically lack it in the other area. And because the Americans are seen not to be playing fair, or even even-handed about the Palestinian question then whatever they do in Iraq is seen by many people are equally unfair because it comes from a contaminated source. You may say, and the Americans do say, but that is not fair. And I would agree it isn’t fair but that is the perception. And perception in this area is the reality. And if people see it like that, that is how it is.
Similarly on this question of terrorism and occupation. Yes I agree it is very difficult. One person’s liberation struggle is another person’s terrorism. I think there is a general acceptance by most sensible activists, even in the Palestinian cause that suicide bombings do not help the cause because they do not bring sympathy from outsiders who in the end must use the pressure that will produce a settlement. It is a step too far, regardless of whether it is moral or right. I would condemn it simply on humanitarian grounds. If we are looking purely from a pragmatic Machevillian point of view does it work because it alienates more people than it encourages. And therefore the whole question of terrorism and what terrorism is, is a question of definition. But Blair is a little more nuianced on the idea of resistance and occupation and terrorism. But in the end if groups form links with each other, which inevitably they do because of similar perceptions. If those struggling hardest for liberation in Palestine are also those giving greatest support to Al Qaeda, then of course those links become very blurred in Western minds as well. And Western minds do see the struggle against occupation in the same category as occupation. And that is the problem.

Conference participant: You mentioned Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda committed criminal acts but the reporting is very one-sided. When Israeli civilians get killed the whole of the media take up the issue but when innocent Palestinians gets killed there is a lack of coverage and nobody cares.

Michael Binyon: I think you are exaggerating. When you say nobody cares read the British press more carefully in the last year or so. If Palestinians are killed by Israeli gunships there is quite a lot written about it in the British press.

Conference participant: You said that Mr Bush cannot work for any new initiative due to the elections and he is sponsored by the other side. I don’t know what you mean by the other side.

Michael Binyon: I am talking about the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli question and the feeling is that there are attempts to make Mr Bush appear more even-handed. Put more pressure on Israel. Israel has a number of key supporters in the United States, not simply Jewish voters but the Christian right who are very strong, pro-Israeli supporters and they would see any change in the American emphasis between the Palestinians and the Israelis as wrong and misguided and they would not vote for a president or a party that is pushing in that direction.

Conference participant: If the Americans pour money into Iraq would it not put pressure on a future Iraqi government to toe their line. From your discussions with the Iraqi government do they have any policy for dealing with debts? Do your calculations include debts to Gulf countries?

Conference participant: What would happen if Kerry was elected President?

Conference participant Has Iraq been opened up to all the terrorists so they don’t attack Washington?

Justin Alexander: Yes, they do. And there is a considerable debate about whether the money provided was ever structured as loans. Every Iraqi I talked to said no these were grants. They were afraid of Iran. No one to my knowledge has seen any documents proving that these funds given were ever loans not grants.
As for the policy of the Iraqi government in private all the parties I talked to and I talked to most of the major parties in the governing council and some outside that, they all say that most of the debt is illegitimate. In terms of policy the Iraqi Governing Council is not going a great deal at the moment. The people in the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning are dealing with these issues, and they are very knowledgeable people but they do not yet feel able yet to make very strong arguments.

Michael Binyon: What would happen if Kerry was elected president? I think this would cause considerable difficult in Downing Street just as the election of a fellow socialist in Spain caused enormous difficulty for Mr Blair. The difficulty is two fold. First of all Tony Blair knows that within the Labour Party, and probably within the country itself, everybody would like to see Kerry elected Bush. Therefore it would be very difficult not to welcome President Kerry as the one we really always wanted to do business with. But the problem is that this involves a second switch, for a second time. The first big problem Tony Blair had was that he was Bill’s best buddy. So Blair had to make a switch all of a sudden from being a keen Clinton man to being George Bush’s friend. The problem is that Britain’s interest lies in having decent relations with anybody in the White House. That is a strategic given as far as British Foreign Policy is concerned. So you do have to get along with whoever it is. But if you then have President Kerry and a change in policy it would take a little bit of adjustment. I think actually deep in his heart, Tony Blair would not be to upset by that. He has been left high and dry several times by President Bush. Most infuriatingly about five months ago when he spent a huge amount of political credibility on saying these weapons of mass destruction may still be there and we will find them if we keep looking, you get people in the Pentagon saying we think they were probably never there in the first place. So his political credibility as far as the Bush people are concerned is expendable and I think his affection for the American administration is equally expendable.
Finally on the point of opening up Iraq to all the terrorists so they don’t attack Washington, I think that is conspiracy too far. I don’t think politics is really governed by clever conspiracies. It is just a piece of mis-management or the way things happen. It has turned out that way, I don’t think it was thought of that way.

Saeed Shehabi: Will the amount of money America is pouring into Iraq at the moment one day be referred to as a grant and can it be used to pressurise a future Iraqi government. I would also like to hear from Jeremy Cobyrn, MP because Michael mentioned that even those who were opposed to the war are not calling for a speedy withdrawal of troops or for practical reasons. I wanted to hear what are the voices of the anti-war campaign? What are the views of the anti-war coalition after these latest developments in Iraq?

Justin Alexander: That is a very good question. Last year when the appropriations programme was being discussed in the American Congress regarding the reconstruction money it was suggested by some people that it should be structured as a loan not as a grant. Thankfully that did not come through. It has structured as a grant. It would be crazy if it had been structured as a loan because the money being spent by America on American corporations with benefits for America. Where is this reconstruction money, there is no employment for Iraqis, no rebuilding. But yes you are right when Iraq is in debt it can’t stand on its own two feet and it has to rely on the generosity of creditors and foreign donors. So that is a real danger to Iraq in the future.

Chairman: Jeremy Cobyrn was very supportive of the Iraqi people following the occupation of Iraq. We met him many times with Kate Hoey when he was in the opposition. He was very instrumental in helping us put a motion through Kate Hoey. We were there for three days in Strasbourg and we managed to get a motion passed that there was a Shia minority in Iraq who were subjected to atrocities such as genocide by Saddam’s regime. This has helped at least to put the suffering of the Shia Iraqis on the map. So may I take the opportunity to thank you for your efforts 12 years later and invite you to answer the question.

Jeremy Cobyrn: Thank you for you kind words Chair regarding the atrocities in the past because there are many in this country, in the anti-war movement who have been very consistent in supporting human rights initiatives in Iraq, be it under Saddam Hussein or under the current situation.
As to the current situation what most people in the anti-war movement think it clearly is not sustainable that Britain and the USA would keep a large number of troops in Iraq, now being attacked by a very interesting range of opponents of essentially three different varieties. And the forces themselves have no legal legitimacy there anyway. I would personally support two things: the creation of a government of Iraq that is representative and accountable to the Iraqi people rather than being selected by the two occupying powers. Secondly the withdrawal of British and American troops. If the Iraqi people wish it, and they probably would, then some kind of international force that is under Iraqi control or under Iraq’s invitation to be there through the UN. The alternative of the US staying there well after June 30th and loosing more and more troops and becoming figures of attack I think Edward Kennedy may have hit the nail on the head when he said that Iraq is turning into something like a desert version of Vietnam. It is quagmire and I suspect that there must be a lot of very deep thought going on now in the Pentagon, the White House and the State Department which George Bush is not involved in asking how the hell do we get out of this mess? John Kerry is probably doing the same thing. I think the pressure for the US to withdraw is going to be very strong indeed as they are going to become the figure of the whole issue rather than the removal of Saddam Hussin.

Michael Binyon: I think that an international force has to be given international legitimacy. I am not very optimistic of the view that the US should pull out straight away and let everyone else take over will actually happen. If the US pulls out all its troops nobody else will go there or at least very few others. I think it is quite possible that under a UN mandate quite a lot of other troops may go in who would then join the Americans who would than pull out quite a lot of their troops. But I do not see a large peace-keeping force without the Americans being in Iraq.

Conference participant: You talk about a nominal Iraqi government but there are no details. If it is going to be another version of the Iraqi Governing Council we are going to see more of seeing today. What about the constitution and the role of Shariah? What is the influence of Islamic law on the legal system?
I have no love for Sadr but if we talk about him having no street credibility what worries me is that the four official Shia leaders are also loosing street credibility. It doesn’t matter what he is? He was described as a hojatislam which he is not. But unless something done, unless some clear indication is given to the Shia of Iraq, this man Sadr is going to be a Shia leader.

Michael Binyon: I simply agree with you on the final point. I think that is what I mean by opportunist. He has seen his chance and he has gone with it. Like it or not he has seen his opportunity and he has gone for it.
The second point about the lack of clarity about the kind of government it is going to be. Of course there is a lack of clarity because frankly people are having to make things up as they go along. The wish is to have a proper constitutional balance, a fully representative government. But the question is how do you get that. You have to start with something and you have to hand over to some government which is clearly not going to have much of a life but which will evolve, either through elections or through simply through a de facto power struggle, into a government that will be more representative than everybody else.

Chairman: The representative of Ayatollah Sistani is coming here next week from 3pm – 5pm, Ayatollah Al Hureifi who is going to give us an inside view on the constitution and the ayatollah’s assessment of the situation. For people who want to understand the street credibility of the leaders.

Jeremy Cobyrn: A degree of opportunism is involved but support is going to shift very rapidly to him because he is seen to be there and to be an opponent of the occupation. Two other things I find interesting is why the US strategy after the invasion was to destroy all existing institutions including the army. So they have been left with nothing to work through other than themselves, no other civil administration. They have appointed a government that is more and more isolated in their strategy. It seems to be in tatters.
Another thing is the difference between the Kurdish area in the north and the rest of Iraq. It is relatively stable and safe and has some kind of administration. Are we actually seeing the break up of Iraq in this whole process.


Conference participant : One thing you did not mention about the withdrawal of troops from Iraq is economic pragmatism. At what point do you think the cost will be so high that the troops will be withdrawn.
When we are discussing Iraq and other issues the wider picture is not painted. Where would you put Iraq in the pattern of what has been going on in American foreign policy since 1945. Iraq is not just something that happened by accident.

Michael Binyon: First of all cost. At the moment, not a very big political issue. Partly because Britain has an economy that is performing reasonably well and there does not seem to be a huge drain on resources. Secondly we have what is known as a contingency fund. There is money put aside for disasters like this. They are able to draw on a certain amount of money without it affecting the daily budget of other spending ministries. Thirdly the scale of the British undertaking in Iraq is so small compared to the scale of the American undertaking. For the Americans it is a pretty serious cost. They were talking about $87 billion or something of that kind. That is serious money even for a country that is so wealthy. But as far as Britain is concerned it is considerably less. As far as the cost of military operations is concerned it has never been a big factor in the decision as to whether or not to intervene or to stay intervened in other countries. People would like to get down the cost of Bosnia and Kosovo but that is not a big factor in making the decision.
Now on the second question of the pattern of American foreign policy from Africa to Latin America to Asia since 1945 I think is absolutely untrue. There is no pattern at all. The problem with American foreign policy is that is completely without a pattern. Every time there is a new president, the pattern changes. And that is half the problem of having a long-term strategic vision of how to organise your interests in various parts of the world.
Iraq was not really on the American radar screen for years and years. It only appeared as a result of the Iran embroilo. The fact that America had a deep, deep hatred for a country that threw its diplomats into captivity for 444 days. America then looked at the main opponents of Iran. Who could we help to get revenge on Iran. And the answer was Iraq and that is part of the reason why there was a tilt towards the Iraqis in the Iran – Iraq War even though an objective analysis would have shown that the cause of the war was Iraqi guilt rather than Iranian. The fact is that the US and the West in general tended to tilt towards Iraq and supplied large amounts of weapons. When that went wrong, when it turned out that Saddam was a pretty uncontrollable person and also not a very nice ruler in his own back yard policy began to change and it changed very suddenly as a result of the invasion of Kuwait. Ever since then the policy has been focused entirely on Iraq. Unfortunately America and many other countries, are not very good at putting things in regional context. If you want to serious business in Iraq, you have to have serious relations with Iran. Tony Blair does understand that. He does believe that critical engagement with Iran is absolutely vital if you want any stability in the south of Iraq. Equally many understand that a working relationship with Saudi Arabia is very important if you want any kind of working relationship with the rest of the. The problem is that relations with Saudi Arabia are complicated by all sorts of factors at the moment not least by the fact that Saudi Arabia itself is facing a considerable amount of turmoil from those who are Al Qaeda supporters in its own country. So how to handle the Saudi royal family is something that ought to be part of the Iraqi equation. But there is a sort of disconnect so that these regional questions are not always taken in context or together.

Justin Alexander: In putting Iraq into the context of American foreign policy since the 1940s, accepting the short termism in American foreign policy there is one trend which runs through it. Whereas the British empire was potentially a direct military occupation and a military power the American empire has been largely economic. Americans control countries through debt and the repayment of loans. Iraq is an anolomy like Vietnam was. It is much easier, much cheaper and doesn’t really get noticed when you control countries economically. The military occupation in my view is going to be short – a year, two or three years - but in the long term the way America controls Iraq will be through the way in controls pretty much every other poor country in the world – through debt.

Conference participant: As an ex diplomat a very quick point as to what would happen if Kerry got elected. The British Prime Minister would be on excellent terms with him. It would do him no harm politically. It would not harm British national interests and it would be particularly easy as Kerry stands, as I understand, it for a greater internationalisation of the Iraq issue which is exactly what Blair wants.

Michael Binyon: I agree, the problem is not the same problem as in Spain when you get a new government and the new prime minister says we are going to change the policy in Iraq and that does cause great problems. A Kerry presidency would certainly go down better in the Labour Party and in the country in general. It would be much easier for Blair to do business with him and not be seen as the poodle of an unpopular president.


Conference participant : Thousands of Muslim young people have been stopped and searched. If we want to fight terrorism is this the way to do it? The entire Muslim community is being alienated. There is also a feeling that this war against terror is a recognition of Blair’s failure in Iraq and is being continued by targeting the Muslim community.

Michael Binyon: I hate to be disagreeable but I profoundly disagree. That is completely wrong. There is no wish by the government to alienate the Muslim community. There is a profound wish not to alienate or try not to alienate them. The problem is that many policies of the government are not acceptable to Muslim people. But the problem is how do you integrate a group of British citizens who have very strong political views when they feel that the very views of the government on Palestine and Iraq or whatever are somehow making them feel not acceptable within the community. That is the dilemma. There is a mismatch of understanding there. Also the idea that there is an organised campaign against Muslims is entirely wrong and if Muslims think that they are doing themselves a disservice because ordinary white Britons cannot distinguish who is somebody from India and who is somebody from Pakistan. They simply cannot tell the difference. They all look the same as far as white Britons are concerned?


Conference participant : What about the ultra right?

Michael Binyon: The ultra right is against all foreigners generally – it doesn’t matter what colour you are. They are particularly against people from Asia and the Caribbean. There is a difference between prejudice on racial grounds and prejudice on religious grounds. The government would like to fight and is fighting both. This is immicable not only to Britain but to everything all mainstream conservative parties stand for.
There is a problem with groups of people who voice support for Al Qaeda. And there is a problem with people who are indicating that there might be tacit support for some extremist radical action. What people shout and say doesn’t actually make very much difference. People like Al Bakri and Abu Hamza they make a lot of noise because they are great self publicists. Unfortunately self publicity can sometimes attract people, and particularly young people who grew up in circumstances that are not necessarily very comfortable: poor families, particularly in the north of England, economic depression, a feeling of being slightly on their own, isolated from others. They then feel attracted by groups that are offering something exciting and alternative.
I did not mean to lessen in any way what I think is the tremendous importance of what the Muslim Council of Britain is doing. I think they are a very fine organisation. They are up against a great difficulty because there isn’t the credibility for such a group. I don’t think they should stop doing what they are doing, they are doing a great job. I think it would be a tremendous misreading that this government is institutionally Islamophobic as a way of covering up for its political failing in Iraq. That is absolute nonsense.

Jeremy Cobyrn: With regard to anti terrorist legislation many of us who represent constituencies with minorities – I represent a constituency with large numbers of Muslims and Irish people – all through the 80s was used against the Irish community, ineffectively in terms of dealing with peace in Northern Ireland. Eventually that had to be done through the political process. But 10,000 Irish people were arrested, less than 10 percent were charged and less than one percent were prosecuted. On a much smaller scale under anti terrorist legislation the Home Secretary can detain anyone without trial, indefinitely on the say so of the security services. That is what we are challenging. But the perception among Muslims in my constituency is that this legislation is targeted against them. That is supported by the numbers of people who are being held. It is a very dangerous process. If the government is serious about tackling Islamaphobia and recognising the role of the Muslim community amongst society then it should not have legislation on the statute books that allows this kind of arbitrary arrest to go on.


Conference participant :I read many British newspapers and the feeling that I get is that it is all doom and gloom in Iraq. Nothing good ever happens there. I haven’t read one story about reconstruction, I haven’t read anything about a project being opened, hardly any success stories. And I am wondering is it really that bad or it is just the media never writes anything good. For example, the Kurdistan Development Group just moved into a very posh headquarters in Edgware Road. There are some good things happening in Kurdistan and yet in the media its all grey, its all black.

Michael Binyon: Well, if you read the Times you would read lots of very fine articles. It is true. The media always write bad news. Bad news sells. But the fact is that the broadsheet newspapers – the ones that bother about foreign news generally – have written quite a bit about economic development, which I have to say is remarkable, even in these extremely difficult circumstances. They have written about political pluralism. There has been quite a lot written about the burgeoning of a free press which is happening. There has been quite a lot written about people who are suddenly able to exercise pilgrimage rights or individual rights of that kind and there has been a poll, which opponents of the war say is totally flawed, which shows that quite a lot of people in Iraq feel they are better off now, in some way, then they were a year and a half ago. Economically the figures are quite impressive and the level of oil production is back at least to what it was before if not higher. So there are good things. Economic reconstruction is continuing, it is hard, there is an awful long way to go and there is a lot of injustice to make up. But I think some of the good news stories are getting through. But peoples views of these are entirely coloured by their perception of whether or not the war was justified. And if you say things are getting better in Iraq people say well you are an apologist for the war. I think you can recognise that some things are getting better whether or not you like what happened. The fact is things are getting better in some areas but in other areas, like public security, things are terrible.


Conference participant :If somebody comes to your country with a tent you know they are not going to settle. But if they bring sand and bricks you know they will. America is planning to open an embassy with 3,000 people. They already have four bases.

Michael Binyon: I think that is a very good point. The Americans are looking at a long term stay inconsiderable numbers politically and possibly even militarily. Long terms military stays are not always forever. There have been American bases which people have taken away again. I think we are talking in terms of decades rather than an year or two. There are some occupations, or presences – again I point to Kosovo – where if thing stabilise the Americans would be out tomorrow. They have no interest in Kosovo and similarly. And of course you have to bring a lot of sand and bricks to build barracks even to stay for one winter. I think your perception is right. It is very likely there will be a large presence in Iraq for some time to come.


Conference participant Saddam was a cuddley boy for the West. They trained him, they armed him against his own people. They were watching him killing people. He was doing what he had been asked to do. What is the reason for this change. I want to see if there is some logical explanation to what is happening. You cannot make any Iraqi accept the fact that they are coming as liberators. Even if it is just a matter of oil and oil is a big reason for that but Saddam offered them the whole country. A few days before the war Sheikh Zayed gave Saddam the chance to leave. But the Americans said that even if Saddam left they would still enter. So there must be a reason. I am an Iraqi, I just came from there but I am living there. The Iraqis all believe that the Americans are there to stay and use Iraq as a buffer zone from the Islamic world. Do you have any explanation for this bloody war.

Michael Binyon: That is a view which many people hold. Just one or two points on that. Saddam was never the cudley boy of the West, never!


Conference participant All the world was watching the media the day Saddam bombed Halabja. And still he got loans. Nothing happened.

Chairman: Maybe he wasthe cudley toy not the boy.

Michael Binyon: It depends what you mean by cudley. He was certainly somebody the West worked with and dealt with, or America dealt with. America has dealt with some absolute monsters. Saddam was perhaps the worst. They have also dealt with Muputu in the Congo, dozens of people. If the West only dealt with decent leaders we would hardly talk to anybody. The range from decent to dreadful goes a long way. He is at the furthest edge of dreadful. It is probably true that not much opposition was officially raised about Halabja. But it does not mean that it wasn’t noticed. And it doesn’t mean that the press never thought Saddam was a good thing because they never did. It certainly true that he was in some sense useful in stemming Iran. I agree with you that it doesn’t look like liberation for Iraq and there is a deep suspicion of motives. I don’t think that America or the foreign policy establishment, if there is such a thing, has an idea of building Iraq as a sort of buffer zone to keep the entire Muslim world in subjection because it simply wouldn’t work. Nobody in Washington even thinks it could work. You could not from Iraq control Lebanon, Syria – there are enough diplomats around the world working for the foreign service who can tell them what the reality is. There may be some dreamers in the Pentagon, particularly Mr Wolfitz who thinks they can reshape the Middle East in some new image. Several people have given them a reality lesson in recent months. These ideas that we are the all powerful may have been there for a while but they don’t last long. Your view of what is the case is one that is very widely shared and it is a view that the West would be very foolish to ignore, because if that is how it seems that is how it is.

Chairman: Blair is going across water next week. Does Jeremy Cobyrn have some words of advice, three of four bullet points to take to George Bush?

Jeremy Cobyrn: I would advise him to have a nice meeting with John Kerry. I would advise him to say to Bush that the situation in Iraq is desperate and without international legitimacy it is going to get worse. The view of long term bases being built with a view to staying there is one that is going to cause a lot of problems throughout the region and will make the Americans even more unpopular. The last thing I would say is do something about Israel, the construction of the Palestinian wall, the continued development of settlements in Palestinian territory and do something about the assassination policy of the Israeli government. Those are just a few things he should say to Bush.

Justin Alexander: My suggestion is that the new Security Council resolution which is expected sometime in May or June ends the reparation and disbands the UN Reparations Commissions and America should cancel all its debt problems.

Michael Binyon: The Times does not normally agree with Jeremy Cobyrn. I have to say speaking personally I would endorse his three points.

Chairman: I think it has been a very enlightening evening, I would like to thanks speakers, thank you for your participation. God bless you all

Speakers


Adel Darwish is Senior editor/writer The Middle East Magazine. Regular contributor to The Daily Mail, The Daily & Sunday Telegraph, The Times, The Daily Express, The Economist, The Washington Post, The Scotsman and the Sunday Post. Media Consultant. Commentator on current Affairs, BBC, ITN, Kuwait Radio & Television, CNN, ABC, CBC, NBC, CBS and many others. Member of several think tanks in UK& USA Previous Years. Worked for most major British newspapers for the past 36 years as a foreign correspondent and writer on Foreign affairs starting with Africa in the late 1960 before covering the Middle East from 1974. . Contributed to a number of Arabic language publications like Al-Ahram, Asharq al-Awsat, Al-Alam & RoselYoussef. Produced many programmes for various television networks of various nationalities. Experience working with freespeech organisations (Like Index on Censorship) and on conflict resolution and prevention, and better understanding between nations (like Next Century Foundation for Peace). I allocated two and half days a week to work with Index On Censorship, the London based international. Author of several studies and many papers and reports presented to think tanks and conferences in UK, Europe, and USA & The Middle East. Author of Several books in On The Middle East, Water conflicts, Islamic fundamentalism and unconventional warfare. Author of a number of theatrical plays performed in London, Edinburgh and Europe in 1960s&1970s.

Aytollah Ali Hussain Al Hakim is a Lecturer and researcher. studied at the Islamic Seminary in Qum(Iran), reaching the level of Ijtihad in 1997. He has lectured in Islamic Studies at As-Shaheed As-Sadr school in Qum (Iran), Oslo University (Norway), and the Islamic College for Advanced studies - London. He has written, edited numerous books on Islamic faith. He is fluent in five languages (German, Norwegian, Farsi, English and Arabic). He resides in London, working as a researcher at the Institue of Islamic Studies, and he is member of its Academic Board. He published several books: 8 in Norwegian, 1 in German, 2 in Arabic, and the last book in English "The Awaited Saviour: Questions & Answers”, and various articles in different conferences and seminars.

Michael Binyon has been a leader writer on The Times since 1991. Until February 2000 he was also for nine years the paper's diplomatic editor, following 15 years abroad as a foreign correspondent. He joined The Timesin 1972, as a reporter on the home news desk, moving to the foreign desk a year later and reporting on the 1973 Arab-Israeli war from Amman and Cairo and from Portugal in 1975. Seconded to the Times education supplements, he spent two years in Washington from 1975-77. In 1978 he reopened The Times Moscow bureau after a five-year gap, remaining there until 1982. He was correspondent in Bonn from 1982-85, in Washington from 1985-89 and in Brussels from 1989 until 1991. As well as attending most international summit meetings, writing about world affairs and travelling, he now writes many of The Times editorials on foreign affairs and also transport. After graduating from Cambridge with a degree in English and Arabic, he taught English in Minsk for the British Council in 1967-68, and began in journalism on The Times Educational Supplement in 1968, moving for a year to the BBC Arabic Service and then becoming a founder reporter on The Times Higher Education Supplement. He won two British press awards for reporting from Moscow, and published a book "Life in Russia" in 1983. He speaks French, German, Russian and some Arabic. Married with two children, he was awarded the OBE in June 2000.